by
Major Lonnie O. Ratley III
Barbarossa (" red beard"), surname of
Frederick I of Germany ( 1123-1190). It is said that he never died
but is still sleeping in Kyffhauserberg in Thuringia. There he sits
at a stone table with his six knights, waiting "fulness of time,"
when he will come form his cave to rescue Germany form Bondage and
give her the foremost place of all the world. His beard has grown
through the table-slab but must wind itself thrice around the table
before his second advent.1
Also, Barbarossa was the
code name for Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union starting on 22
June 1941. At 0340 on that date, the combined air assets of four
Luftwaffe air fleets struck a devastating blow to the Red Air
Force-a blow from which, in many respects, it has not recovered to
this day. The Luftwaffe used 1280 operationally ready combat
aircraft for the first series of air strikes in the war against the
Soviet Union.2 With these air assets the Luftwaffe
destroyed more than 2000 Soviet aircraft on the first day of the
campaign in approximately 18 hours of combat,3 against
their own loss of 35.4 In terms of the number of enemy
aircraft destroyed versus the number of friendly aircraft lost, the
initial Luftwaffe attack against Russia is the most successful
operation in the history of air power. Of the 35 German aircraft
lost, approximately 15 were noncombat related. The problem was the
malfunctioning of fragmentation bomblettes that occasionally
detonated while still in aircraft bomb bays or upon landing. If one
takes only the losses of German aircraft to Soviet defenses, the
ratio of German aircraft losses to Russian aircraft losses is
approximately one to one hundred (1:100).
The first Luftwaffe strikes were conducted
between 0305 and 0315 in concert with the German Army's ground
attack. Twenty to thirty aircrews had been previously handpicked to
deliver special fragmentation bombs (SD-2, 2 kg bomblettes and
SD-10, 10 kg bomblettes) against key Soviet airfields, a flight of
three aircraft being assigned to each field. The purpose of these
early attacks was to cause disruption and confusion as well as to
preclude dispersion of Soviet planes until the main blow was struck
approximately 25 minutes later.5
There was considerable controversy between the
German Army and the Luftwaffe over the timing of the first air
attacks. The army position was firm: the ground commanders wanted
to attack at first light to achieve the maximum amount of tactical
surprise and avoid the problems of control in a night attack. The
Luftwaffe, on the other hand, was tasked with destroying the Red
air forces, so that the army could operate without fear of Russian
air attacks and so the Luftwaffe could provide air support for the
attacking German ground forces. If the army attacked first, then
the Soviet Air Force units would be alerted and would most probably
retire to airfields beyond the reach of the Luftwaffe.6
The resultant compromise was the decision to select a few special
crews for missions with times on target of 0315, the same time as
the beginning of the army attack in the area of Army Group
Center.7
Luftwaffe Targeting Priorities
The initial mission of the Luftwaffe for the
opening stage of Barbarossa was straightforward and specific:
destroy the Red Air Force and its ground organization.8
After completion of this task, the Luftwaffe was to concentrate on
support of the advancing German ground forces.9 These
two missions can best be respectively defined as the first mission
and the main mission of the Luftwaffe.10 The Luftwaffe
had to fulfill the first mission (elimination of the Red Air Force)
prior to concentrating on the main mission, support of the German
Army.
Regarding the first mission of the Luftwaffe in
Barbarossa, destruction of the Red Air Force and its ground
organization, the following priorities were planned:
• Destruction of modern aircraft and the Red Air
Force ground organization.
• Destruction of production facilities for
aircraft and aircraft engines.
• Destruction of aircraft with "M" (modern)
engines.
• Destruction of other
aircraft.11
Bombing of the Russian aircraft industry was not
possible at the start of Barbarossa because the Luftwaffe had no
bombers with sufficient range and payload to reach the Russian
factories.12 The highly successful attacks of the first
few days against the Red Air Force were not an end in themselves.
The Red Air Force had to be eliminated so that the German Army
could move without fear of Russian air interference and so that the
Luftwaffe could concentrate on supporting German Army
operations.
In order to develop a clearer perspective of
Barbarossa's concept, one must have an understanding of the
strategic geography of Germany. Germany was, even in 1941, a
relatively small country. Germany was resource poor with no natural
defensive borders. These factors- size, lack of natural borders,
and insufficient resources-dictated the traditional Prussian-German
military strategy; wars had to be short as there were not enough
natural resources to support a war of attrition. The armed forces
had to concentrate on quality and efficiency as the population base
could not support expendable human resources. Finally, as space was
at a premium, the military strategy had to concentrate on
destroying the enemy forces; there was no room for long-drawn-out
strategic maneuvering. All of these factors drove the Germans to
develop the theory of the Vernichtungsschlacht or battle
of destruction, the classic strategy that would quickly seek a
decisive battle with the enemy to knock the opponent out of the
war. Under these circumstances the concept of
Auftragstaktik or mission tactics was a natural guiding
principle of German military operations at all levels of
command.13 Essentially Auftragstaktik meant
allowing decisions to be made at the lowest possible level in the
chain of command. Furthermore, Germany had to make optimum use of
its leaders as Germany could count on being outnumbered by its
opponents. In Auftragstaktik, the higher echelon assigned
the objective to the lower echelon. The lower echelon determined
how the objective was to be taken. Orders were short, simple,
easily understood, and often only verbal. A commander at any level,
from squad leader to field marshal, was a real commander, not
merely a telephone exchange or copying machine passing on the
directives of higher headquarters to subordinate units.
The concept of Schwerpunkt or point of
critical emphasis must also be understood, as Barbarossa's initial
success was, in large part, due to careful selection of
Schwerpunkte.14
Barbarossa, in its original form, was not a
unique German military operation, just a good one.15 It
was one in a long series of successful operations, having been
preceded by Königgrätz, Sedan, the Schlieffen Plan of 1914, and the
Manstein Plan in 1940.
The Luftwaffe's military style was similar to
that of the German Army. Auftragstaktik was a principle
used as much by the Luftwaffe as it was in the German Army. The
Schwerpunkt concept also manifested itself in the strong
emphasis that the German Air Force placed on dive bombing as
opposed to level carpet or area bombing. The Luftwaffe was
flexible, aggressive, and tactically oriented. The failure of the
German bombing campaign against Great Britain and its associated
lessons were clear to the German military leadership prior to the
start of Barbarossa.
The German air campaign in Barbarossa provides
an excellent example of the Luftwaffe's operational style. Lower
echelons-the squadron level and even flight level-decided the
tactics, weapons, and size of formations to use in destroying the
targets designated by higher echelons. Interference from higher
headquarters was, in general, kept to a minimum, and aircrew
opinions were highly regarded.
Selection of targets for the Luftwaffe was a
logical application of traditional German strategy: namely, destroy
in short order the enemy's ability to conduct warfare by destroying
the enemy's military forces. The Luftwaffe was told to plan for a
short war, and in Barbarossa, as originally planned, strategic
targets for aircraft were irrelevant. The general concept of the
operation was the destruction of the mass of the Red Army in the
western part of the U.S.S.R. Strategic targets-factories, power
plants, population centers-had no bearing on the outcome of a blitz
or lightning campaign of short duration. The Luftwaffe in
Barbarossa was totally committed to tactical support of the German
Army. In the words of Field Marshal Kesselring: "I instructed my
air force and flak generals to consider the wishes of the Army as
my orders.16
Target Planning
Major Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg was officially
assigned to Air Fleet One as Chief of Intelligence in March
1941.17 He was tasked with determining the order of
battle of the Red Air Force and later the targeting of the Russian
aircraft and ground installations. The units that came under his
control for intelligence gathering consisted of two radio intercept
sites, a long-range reconnaissance squadron
(Lufthansa)18 and a long-range reconnaissance squadron
(regular Luftwaffe), and finally, access to Reichsfuehrer
Heinrich Himmler's security service organization for
screening émigrés from the Soviet Union.
The Luftwaffe High Command directed
Loytved-Hardegg to investigate the following special points of
interest:
• Is it true that 9000 Soviet aircraft are still
in the western part of the U.S.S.R.?
• Were these 9000 aircraft supplemented with
modern aircraft?
•Where were the industrial plants producing
modern aircraft and modern engines?
It is noteworthy that the collection of
intelligence data for targeting the highly successful Luftwaffe
operation during the first critical days of Barbarossa was handled
by a major with a staff of three officers. The same staff also
designated all Luftwaffe targets opposite the German Army Groups
North and Center. The success of the Luftwaffe strikes makes a
convincing argument for small, competent planning staffs.
Two incidents that occurred during this
intelligence-gathering phase are particularly significant. The
first involved a Luftwaffe long-range reconnaissance mission in a
newly developed special reconnaissance aircraft, the Junkers Ju
86P, which was capable of reaching altitudes of 34,000 feet. On a
mission deep into Russian territory, one Ju 86P was forced down by
a Russian interceptor. This concerned Major Loytved-Hardegg, as the
general impression in early 1941 had been that the Russians had no
modern aircraft capable of intercepting German aircraft above
30,000 feet.
Another incident involved a recently emigrated
engineer of German ancestry who had been allowed to leave the
Soviet Union under the terms of the recently negotiated
Russo-German Nonaggression Pact (1939). The engineer was screened
because of his employment in an aircraft factory. The émigré was
quickly identified as an expert in alloy technology. His
engineering work in a Russian aircraft engine factory had produced
such excellent results that the Russians paid him in gold.
Loytved-Hardegg was astounded that a man of such talent had been
released by the Russians and that Russia had such highly skilled
personnel in their aircraft industry. These two incidents led
Loytved-Hardegg to be more concerned about the technical capability
of the Russians. Loytved-Hardegg was of the opinion that the
Russians were not as backward and unsophisticated in certain
technical fields vital to war production as many people in Germany
and the West had been led to believe.
Loytved-Hardegg estimated that there were
approximately 15,000 aircraft in the Red Air Force, of which 350
were considered by the Germans to be modern aircraft. The
Loytved-Hardegg intelligence organization determined that there
were about 2000 airfields in western U.S.S.R. This information,
when presented to Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, was not
well received.19 According to Loytved-Hardegg, Göring
did not pass this information on to the Armed Forces High
Command-it was not conceivable to Göring that a "primitive" people
such as the Russians could have this many aircraft.
Loytved-Hardegg's reservations never had a
chance of altering Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union.
Although he was persona1ly apprehensive about the chances of
success, Loytved-Hardegg worked thoroughly and, as subsequent
events proved, effectively in selecting targets for the Luftwaffe.
The targeting priorities established by Loytved-Hardegg for the
first day of Barbarossa were the following:
• New aircraft with associated ground
organization.
• Production facilities for modern aircraft and
modern aircraft engines.
• Aircraft with modern engines.
• Other aircraft.
• Red Air Force ground organization.
• Support of the Army.
The second of the priorities was impossible to
fulfill as the factories were beyond the range of German bombers
available at that time.
Approximately 2000 Soviet airfields within a 250
kilometer belt from the western border of the U.S.S.R. were known
to the Germans at the start of Barbarossa.2° Of these
airfields, four in the north and seven opposite German Army Group
Center had modern aircraft. Each occupied airfield had an average
of 30 aircraft.
Major Loytved-Hardegg's organization prepared
sealed target folders for each Luftwaffe group commander involved
in Barbarossa. The group commanders passed the appropriate target
information on to the individual squadron commanders, who in turn
passed the data to their aircrews. Security was therefore
compartmentalized. Many aircrews had only eight hours notice before
they took off for their missioris.21 It was felt that
more effect could be achieved by surprise rather than by detailed
planning, which would entail probable security leaks. Extensive
aircrew mission planning was also considered less critical as most
of the crews were experienced and their training had emphasized
flexibility. The principle of Auftragstaktik provided the
Luftwaffe with the capability of flexible tactics and maximum
utilization of aircrew skills. The Luftwaffe leadership did not
consider the very short notification as any great liability.
After all the analysis was completed, targeting
for the Luftwaffe was finalized. It is noteworthy that specific
targets for missions after the disruptive and first-wave Luftwaffe
attacks were not assigned.22 The Luftwaffe waited for
reports of bombing effects from returning aircrews and
reconnaissance pilots before assigning subsequent air strikes-as
some targets would need to be struck again, while others had been
completely destroyed or were not worth striking at all. The final
target list for the first wave of Luftwaffe air attacks in
Barbarossa was as follows: 31 airfields, 3 suspected higher staff
quarters, 2 barracks, 2 artillery positions, 1 bunker position, 1
petroleum, oil and lubricants depot, and the port facilities at
Sevastopol.23 The success of the Luftwaffe attacks was
to astound both the Germans had the Russians.
Execution
A total of 868 aircraft-637 strike aircraft
(Stukas, bombers, destroyers) and 231 fighters (Me l09s)-took part
in the first wave against the previously mentioned
targets.24 Results from air strikes against targets
other than aircraft are not available, for an exact accounting was
not made at the time of the attack. However, aircraft loses,
friendly and enemy, are known. Preliminary Soviet aircraft losses
from first Luftwaffe strikes totaled (conservatively) 222 destroyed
in the air and 890 on the ground.25 German aircraft
losses for the first wave were as follows: 2 Me l09s, l Me 110, 1
Ju 87, 8 Ju 88s, and 6 He 111s. This total of 18 German aircraft is
somewhat misleading as a number of the losses were caused by weapon
malfunctions with the SD-2 and SD-b fragmentation
bombs.26
Retired Luftwaffe Colonel Robert Poetter has
given a personal account of the first mission flown by his unit in
support of Army Group North.27 At that time Poetter was
a major commanding the I Group of Bomber Wing 76, equipped with Ju
88As. His unit was stationed at Jesau south of Königsberg.
Poetter's target was the Russian Kadania airfield in Lith uania.
Poetter had learned about Barbarossa and his group's mission the
day before from his commander, Lieutenant General Foester, at a
meeting of all wing and group commanders in I Air Corps.
Poetter had complete freedom of action relative
to the tactics to use in destroying the Red Air Force aircraft and
ground organization at the Kadania airfield. Using the target
folders prepared by Major Loytved-Hardegg, Colonel Poetter's group
planned a high-level entry (4000 meters altitude), with a low-level
attack and low-level departure. The munitions used by the group's
attacking Ju 88As were the SD-2 fragmentation bomblettes. Each Ju
88 was loaded with a total of 360 individual. SD-2s. The airfield
target area had been divided, into three sections, each one
allocated to one of the three squadrons in I Group of Bomber Wing
76.
The mission started with 0210 takeoff and ended
landing at 0403. After approaching the Kadania airfield at higher
altitude and sighting the targets, the Ju 88s dove to low (treetop)
altitude and made one pass with the SD-2s. Colonel Poetter recalls
seeing about 30 Russian aircraft at the field. The Luftwaffe group
lost only one aircraft, a Ju 88 which flew into an airborne SD-2
that had been released from another Ju 88.
Poetter related that a bomber unit to which he
had previously been assigned, working at that time (22 June 1941)
with Army Group South, was severely restricted, by the air corps
commander, as to the type of tactics to use in the first day's
attacks with the SD-2s. Not only the target but the exact ingress,
egress, and tactics were specified. In contrast to the relatively
low loss rate for Poetter's group in the north, the other group's
losses were extremely high using the rigidly specified
tactics.28 The losses suffered by the unit in the south
were due mainly to small caliber fire; as ingress, egress, and
attack were all conducted at low level. Target identification was
very difficult, and exposure time to small caliber antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) was longer. Poetter feels that one of the major
reasons for his group's success, working under General Foester, was
that Foester allowed his commanders to determine the tactics that
they felt were best and did not dictate the manner in which
operations were to be carried out. In Poetter's words: "We were
told what we had to do, but not how to do it."
The enormity of the Luftwaffe success for the
first few days of the campaign, and especially the first day, was
dramatic. That first day the Germans traded 35 aircraft for
approximately 2000 Russian aircraft. Russian aircraft losses then
tapered off after the first few days of combat, illustrating the
effect of surprise on enemy loses early in the campaign. It is
noteworthy that the operational readiness rate of the Luftwaffe at
the start of Barbarossa was only 70 percent.29 Had the
Luftwaffe taken more time and devoted less energy to eleventh-hour
unit movements toward the east to participate in the campaign, they
could have pushed the operational readiness rate much closer to 100
percent. However, a determination was made that surprise was a more
valuable factor than mere numbers of attacking aircraft. The fact
that only 868 combat strike aircraft, of 1280 available for
operations, were used in the first wave of attacks supports this
position. Commenting in his diary, on the success of the Luftwaffe,
General Otto Hoffmann von Waldu states that 80 percent of the
success of the attack was due to surprise.30
As a result of the tremendous number of enemy
aircraft destroyed during the first few days of Barbarossa, the
Russians suffered a severe loss of self-confidence in their
ability. Although tactics in general tended to be quite regimented,
the Red Air Force was the largest in the world in 1941, and the
U.S.S.R. had an equally large aircraft industry to support its air
force.31 At that time the Red Air Force was a power with
which any potential aggressor had to reckon. The soldiers and
airmen of the Soviet Union had been constantly bombarded with
propaganda about the invincibility of the Red Army,32 so
one can imagine the tremendous shock that swept through the Red Air
Force when the magnitude of the initial Luftwaffe successes against
the U.S.S.R. became known: from the world's largest air force to
one that could not even maintain local air superiority-
all in one day. Throughout the war the Red Air Force improved, but
man for man and machine for machine, it was never a match for the
Luftwaffe. German close air support aircraft would often work
without benefit of air cover for protection from Soviet
fighters,33 even when they became engaged with enemy
aircraft.
The rigidity of Russian air tactics at the start
of Barbarossa was almost unbelievable. Field Marshal Erich von
Manstein described an incident at a bridge on the Duna River which
had been captured intact by the Germans. On that occasion wave
after wave of Russian bombers attacked the bridge at low altitude.
At the end of the day, 64 attacking Russian aircraft had been
destroyed by German fighters and flak.34 In the Red Air
Force, blind obedience to the flight leader was the norm. General
Lovtved-Hardegg stated that only the flight leader in Russian
bomber formations actually knew what the target was, and he was
also the only crew member with an aeronautical
chart.35
It must be reiterated that Barbarossa was
supposed to be a short campaign. The Luftwaffe actions supported
this concept. The Luftwaffe gained air superiority, but it did not
eradicate the Red Air Force. The Luftwaffe was able to provide
extensive support for German Army operations as early as the first
day of the campaign, and this support grew daily. Then the
Luftwaffe mission shifted quickly to interdiction and close air
support, the latter being most prominent during all of 1941. The
German Army, with Luftwaffe support for ground operations, was able
to operate without fear of effective Red Air Force
interference.
The Luftwaffe in Barbarossa
Perhaps without realizing it at the time, the
Luftwaffe air attack plan for the start of Barbarossa was probably
the most efficient possible considering the air assets available to
the Germans in 1941. Had the Germans opted for a strategic bombing
effort against Russian industry-as opposed to concentrating on
tactical air support-the highly successful first phase of
Barbarossa might have miscarried.
At the time the Germans had no effective
strategic air force so they concentrated on two tasks: the first
mission and the main mission. The first mission was the destruction
of the Soviet air forces and the main mission the support of the
attacking German Army with all means possible. The main mission
emphasized continuous air attacks against enemy defenses,
especially in breaking down Soviet fortified positions and
hindering the forward movement of Russian reserves by air attacks
on highways and railroads. The continuous tactical air support of
the spearheads of the attacking German Army had
priority.36
The Luftwaffe became more and more involved in
its mission as the German front moved eastward. Initially there was
some discussion of air assets being "saved for the final push
against Great Britain after the Russian situation had been 'cleaned
up'."37 However, as the Luftwaffe settled into a long,
drawn-out war on the Eastern Front, such optimistic speculation was
silenced.
Regarding the targeting of C3,
basically it can be stated that this targeting was not a policy of
the Luftwaffe in the early stages of Barbarossa. However, the
Luftwaffe did target three higher staff headquarters for the
initial first wave attacks on 22 June 1941. Several factors may
have contributed to the Luftwaffe decision regarding C3.
Basically, the Russian communications system, their transportation
net, and their command structure were primitive by German
standards. Lack of sophisticated communications even manifested
itself in the air with the Red Air Force. For example, only the
flight leader in a Russian bomber formation had navigation aids and
target information.38 None of the four former Luftwaffe
officers interviewed here,39 all of whom were involved
in operations during the first four weeks of Barbarossa, can
remember a Luftwaffe air attack against a higher headquarters or
communication center.40 Yet, all of them recall being
very heavily engaged in attacks against airfields, railroads,
railroad stations, and transportation chokepoints.41
Many C3 targets were destroyed, but
they tended to be destroyed as by-products of larger operations
whose goal was the physical destruction of enemy military forces.
Regarding communications, Colonel Poetter said they would often
avoid destroying an enemy (lower echelon) command post as they
could use transmissions from that command post for timely
intelligence data.42 Conversely, there was heavy
emphasis on precluding the withdrawal of Red Army forces deep into
the interior of the U.S.S.R., as well as hindering the
reinforcement of front-line Soviet forces with manpower and
materiel reserves.
Of all the documents researched for this study,
there was only one mention of C3 targeting. The VIII Air
Corps targets included interruption of enemy communications and
elimination of enemy command structure by elimination of known
battlefield command posts.43 These targets followed the
listings ordering the destruction of enemy air forces and support
of forward armored units. General Loytved-Hardegg said that they
would have attacked C3 targets had they known where they
were, but the primitive nature of the Soviet C3 system
in 1941 precluded this option.44
Lessons Learned-German Viewpoint
There were three main reasons for the success of
Barbarossa: surprise, Schwerpunkt, and
Auftragstaktik.45 To these factors stated by
General Graf von Kielmansegg, Colonel Freiherr von Beust added the
factor of flexibility.46 Considering the equipment
available and the resources allocated to the Luftwaffe, its
contribution to Barbarossa can be considered near optimum use of
available assets. In retrospect there were, of course, mistakes
made by the Luftwaffe. One such mistake was that aircraft were held
back for the future offensive against Britain in anticipation of
the Russian campaign's being successfully concluded.47
The Russian offensive was never concluded. However, the decision to
hold back aircraft was made at the highest political level in
Germany at that time and bears no relationship to the tremendous
Luftwaffe success in Barbarossa's first phase. Another key problem
was raised by General Loytved-Hardegg; he felt that staff agencies
were often redundant, e.g., Air Fleet staffs, Air Corps staffs, and
Wing staffs. These staffs tended to duplicate one another and often
precluded timely action.48
The overall lessons learned from Luftwaffe
support of the first stage of Barbarossa can be summarized as
follows:
• The Luftwaffe was a tactical air force in
effect subordinated to the Army.
• As a general rule, in the Luftwaffe
responsibility for attainment of missions was delegated to the
lowest possible level.
• Luftwaffe unit commanders were trained in the
traditional German manner, and their actions reflected that
training.
• The Luftwaffe effectively eliminated the Red
Air Force for the planned duration of Barbarossa.
• After the elimination of the Red Air Force,
the Luftwaffe concentrated its efforts on close air support and
interdiction in support of Army operations.
• Effective strategic air operations were
nonexistent during Barbarossa.
• Air reconnaissance was highly valued by the
German Army; approximately 25 percent of the German combat aircraft
were assigned to reconnaissance.
Lessons Learned-Soviet Application
What did the Russians learn from Barbarossa
relative to air power? First of all, had the Russians used their
rather large 1941 military machine with some competence and finesse
they would not have suffered the massive defeat they did in the
summer of that year, nor would they have lost twenty million
Russians killed over the following four years trying to recover
what they had lost to the Germans in four months. The fact is that
the Russians did not use their assets wisely or effectively during
the first part of Barbarossa, and they paid a very high price for
the incompetence of their governmental leaders. Stalin himself has
been heavily criticized by his fellow Russians for the purges of
the thirties which eliminated many of Russia's more competent
military leaders, Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevski being among the
most prominent. Stalin was personally unconvinced that the Germans
would actually attack Russia. He had been warned repeatedly by his
own intelligence organizations as well as by foreign powers of the
impending German attack,49 yet Stalin chose not to heed
the warnings. The Soviet dictator's one-man style of leadership
permeated the Red Army and Air Force and was in part responsible
for the needless loss of personnel and aircraft. Sycophantic
leaders dominated the upper echelons of the Red Army in 1941.
The Russians were surprised by the Germans, and
this caused the Soviets severe losses that were compounded by
Russia's lack of an effective communications net. For example, at
0130 on 22 June, approximately two hours before the first German
attacks, Stalin was finally convinced of a German invasion, and he
ordered the alert of the army and dispersal of the Red Air Force
units assigned in the western border areas of the U.S.S.R.
Unfortunately for the Russians, this vital order was delayed along
the Russian communications chain and did not reach the appropriate
units until after the German attack.50
Lessons from the Russian's point of view, then,
can be summarized as follows:
• Being surprised costs one dearly.
• Incompetent military leadership selected
because of political loyalty alone precludes effective combat
operations.
• Attacking first and seizing the initiative
pays tremendous dividends.
• Lack of effective communication hinders the
control and effectiveness of military forces.
In a blitz campaign the exchange ratios are very
high in favor of the attacker and then go down rapidly with the
passing of time as the effect of surprise wears off. If the
attacker maintains the initiative and his momentum, the campaign is
concluded before this favorable exchange ratio starts to drop off.
The campaign against the Red Air Force is a case in point. The air
battle was essentially won by the Luftwaffe in the first two days,
after which the Luftwaffe had air superiority and operated
essentially unhindered in its support of the army for the duration
of the planned time for the Barbarossa campaign.
The key questions now are: How will the Soviets
be expected to conduct a blitz of their own aimed at the West
European states? How has Russia's experience with the Luftwaffe in
Barbarossa affected their thinking? If the Soviets follow
the lessons learned from the Luftwaffe, then in a general
conventional attack against Western Europe, they can be expected to
do the following:
• Sacrifice total numbers available and instead
opt for a surprise attack in the form of a lightning first
strike.
• Attempt to eliminate the opposition air forces
at the start of combat operations.
• Concentrate on destruction as opposed to
disruption; i.e., disruption would only be a means to an end, which
would be the destruction of enemy forces.
• Heavily commit air forces to aid in the
support of ground operations.
• Improve the efficiency of their own
communications.
If the Soviets attack NATO, will the results of
Soviet Air Forces have the same effect as did the Luftwaffe's
attacks against the Russians in the summer of 1941? Clearly the
answer is no. To assume that the Russians could expect the same
aircraft combat exchange ratio of 100:1, demonstrated by the
Germans in 1941, is unreasonable. Large numbers of NATO combat
aircraft are parked in blast-hardened shelters. A significant
portion of NATO's air forces is in a
constant alert status. NATO's early warning
radar net is highly efficient and could be expected to preclude a
complete surprise air attack against NATO airfields. In spite of
all these differing conditions that have enhanced the defensive, a
massive Soviet surprise attack could seriously, or even critically,
hamper NATO's ability to defend Western Europe.
The Soviets do not need a 100:1 exchange ratio
of aircraft, as the Warsaw Pact air forces already substantially
outnumber the NATO air forces. At an exchange ratio of 1:1, the
attacking Warsaw Pact would have many aircraft left over to support
their ground operations. It can be further assumed that if the
Soviets follow the lessons learned from the Luftwaffe in
Barbarossa, the Russians will attempt to destroy as many NATO
aircraft as possible at the start of the campaign.
One might consider himself in the position of
the Warsaw Pact air force commander and pose this question: How can
I best support the ground forces in this attack on NATO? Two
factors immediately come to mind. The Warsaw Pact ground forces
want protection from NATO air attacks and protection of Warsaw Pact
logistics support from NATO aircraft conducting interdiction
missions. These factors require air superiority, and the least
expensive method for attaining air superiority is to destroy the
enemy's air force on the ground. It must be remembered, however,
that the Germans in Barbarossa did target three suspected higher
staff headquarters for attack in the first wave of attacking
Luftwaffe aircraft. It was apparently felt at that time that these
staff headquarters were of such importance that a few sorties could
be spared from the primary mission of obtaining air
superiority.
One significant difference between the Luftwaffe
case in 1941 and that in Europe today is that the Germans in 1941
did not know where all of the Russian airfields were. The Germans
attempted to pinpoint the Russian airfields, but they were not
certain of their locations. Conversely, it can be assumed that the
Soviets today know the exact locations of all NATO airfields. It
would appear to be a logical and tempting option for the Warsaw
Pact air commander to allocate all of his combat aircraft assets
for immediate and simultaneous air attacks against all of the NATO
airfields at the start of combat operations.
Another option would be to allocate a portion of
the attacking Warsaw Pact aircraft to key C3 targets,
while the vast majority of combat aircraft would be dedicated to
destroying NATO's air forces. This second option would parallel the
Luftwaffe attack in June of 1941.
LUFTWAFFE operations during the opening stages
of Barbarossa were enormously successful and fulfilled the
Luftwaffe's role in the overall design of the original German plan
for the destruction of the Red Army. The ultimate result of the
German decision to. attack the Soviet Union was the total
destruction of the Third Reich. It can be argued, however, that the
German political initiatives after 1940 were not on par with the
competence of German military operations. Furthermore, one of the
primary reasons for the defeat of Germany in World War II was the
failure of the German leadership to view military operations as
"continuation of politics by other means" oriented toward political
objectives. Notwithstanding these limitations, from a purely
military perspective the Luftwaffe campaign against the Red Air
Force and the subsequent support of the German Army during
Barbarossa were successful by any measure.
Ramstein AB, Germany
Notes
1. As abridged from E. Cobham Brewer, The Reader's Handbook:
Famous Names in Fiction, Allusions, References, Proverbs, Plots:
Stories and Poems (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1899), p. 88.
2. Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv Freiburg,
Federal Republic of Germany, "Der Luftwaffenaufmarsh 1941 gegen
Russland," from Gen, Qu. 6 Abteilung.
3. Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War
Diaries (New York, 1975), p. 317.
4. Bundesarchiv, "Auszug aus den
Lageberichten," OBd.L. (Ic).
5. Bekker, p. 311.
6. Ibid., p. 312.
7. The special crews were selected for their
abilities at blind flying and navigation as they would have to
proceed to their targets at high altitude and before first light to
avoid detection by the Russians. See Bekker, The Luftwaffe War
Diaries.
8. Interview with Brigadier General Rudolf
Loytved-Hardegg, Luftwaffe retired, Nürnberg, Federal Republic of
Germany, 18 January 1980.
9. Major General Herbert J. Rieckhoff, Luftwaffe
retired, "Geheimnisse um die Luftwaffe der Sowjetunion," Flug
Wehr und Technik, Nr 8, August 1948, p. 182.
10. Bundesarchiv (Lw 118/4 4a) "Der Feldzug
gegen Sowjetrussland," Major General (signature illegible) retired,
March 1953.
11. This is a translation of the original German
document which did not specify the tasks of VIII Air Corps. Other
accounts are more specific; for example, see: "General Kommand VIII
Fliegerkorps,' Oberst v. Heinernann.
12. Ibid. Also see Paul-Werner Hozzel's
Recollections and Experience of a Stuka Pilot, 1931-45
(Columbus, Ohio: Battelle, 1978).
13. Germany's historical position was that of
the bulwark of Western Europe, behind which Western culture was
able to flourish and expand. Germany was Europe's forward defense
against alien invasiqn. This role was dutifully fulfilled, in turn
by the Teutonic knights, electors of Brandenburg-Prussia, kings of
Prussia, and German emperors. This tradition was also very much
alive in the Third Reich. It is no wonder, then, that Germany's
"best and brightest" flocked to the officer corps. In a country
with easily accessible borders, small size, and limited resources,
national survival depended on having efficient and effective armed
forces.
14. A Schrwerpunkt is a point where the
success of the operation comes into critical focus. In the French
campaign of May-June l940, the Schwerpunkt was at Sedan on
the Meuse River on 13 May 1940. At that point the success or
failure of the entire campaign was decided. Had Lieutenant Colonel
Hermann Balçk's First Rifle Regiment not secured the west bank of
the Meuse, then the entire campaign would have been in serious
jeopardy. As it was, the successful crossing and subsequent Panzer
drive o the French coast assured the defeat of the Anglo-French
forces.
15. The Germans were on the offensive, and it
can be logically assumed that without the delays and vacillations
of the civilian leadership at that time the German Army would have
successfully terminated the war with Russia based on a continuation
of the offensive from Smolensk toward Moscow in early August
1941.
16. Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring: The Making of
the Luftwaffe (New York, 1978), p. 83.
17. Interview with Loytved-Hardegg. (All of this
information is based on the Loytved-Hardegg interview, unless
otherwise stated.)
18. Photo intelligence was gathered from
Lufthansa civil aircraft which made scheduled flights over the
Soviet Union.
19. Reichsmarschall Göring had a
tremendous effect on the buildup of the Luftwaffe and was often
instrumental in securing priorities (raw materials and personnel)
for the Luftwaffe solely as a function of his position within the
National Socialist hierarchy. Conversely, Göring tended to use his
position as head of the Luftwaffe to influence political decisions,
Or more often to secure the favor of Hitler, which had disastrous
consequences, as evidenced in Göring's boast that the Luftwaffe
alone could eliminate the BEF at Dunkirk in 1940. One of the most
painful consequences of having a major political figure head the
Luftwaffe was the ill-fated attempt to support by air transport the
surrounded German Sixth Army at Stalingrad
20. Interview, Loytved-Hardegg.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Bundesarchiv, "Auszug aus den
Lageberichten OBd.L. Ic," Lage Ost, 22.6.41-28.6.41, p. 3, "Angriff
der ersten Welle."
24. It must be pointed out that the entire
strength of the Luftwaffe was not employed against the U.S.S.R. at
the start of Barbarossa. In fact, only 61 percent of the
Luftwaffe's strength was on the Eastern Front at the start of the
campaign. See previously cited Lageberichten.
25. Lageberichten.
26. The SD weapons were essentially bomblettes
carried inside of a canister, similar to numerous cluster-type
munitions used by air forces today. However, frequently the SD
bomblettes would not all release from the canister after having
been armed. Occasionally a bomblette would detonate inside of the
canister, or would fall out and detonate upon landing, or while
taxiing after landing These inadvertent detonations would destroy,
or severely damage, the aircraft carrying the bomblettes. This was
an especially acute prob1em for aircraft like the Ju 88 and He 111,
which carried the SD canisters in an internal bomb bay. Shortly
after the start of Barbarossa, the SD-type munitions were banned
for all aircraft that had to carry them internally-as opposed to
external bomb racks as in the case with the Stuka.
27. Interview with Colonel Robert Poetter,
Luftwaffe retired, Kronburg, Federal Republic of Germany, 23
January 1980. In his interview Colonel Poetter made extensive use
of his personal pilot's log book, which he kept throughout the
war.
28. Ibid.
29. Lageberichten.
30. Bundesarchiv, General Otto Hoffmann
von Waldau, Luftwaffe retired, "Tagebuch Man '39 - 10.4.42 Chief
des Luftwaffen-fuehrungstabes."
31. Richard C. Lukas, Eagles East: The Army
Air Forces and the Soviet Union 1911-1915 (Tallahassee:
Florida State University Press, 1970), p. 6.
32. Alexander Werth, Russia at War,
1941-1945 (New York, 1964), p. l42.
33. Interview with Brigadier General Paul-Werner
Hozzel, Luftwaffe retired, Karlsruhe, Federal Republic of
Germany, January 1980.
34. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories
(Chicago, 1958).
35. Interview, Loytved-Hardegg.
36. Lieutenant General Paul Deichmann, Luftwaffe
retired, German Air Force Operations in Support of the
Army (New York, 1968), p. 160.
37. Interview, Poetter.
38. Interview with Colonel Hans-Henning Freiherr
von Beust, Luftwaffe retired, München, Federal Republic of Germany,
22 January 1980.
39. Three were flying operational missions; one
was on Air Fleet I staff.
40. Interviews, Loytved.Hardegg, Beust, Poetter,
and Rudel.
41. Ibid.
42. Interview, Poetter.
43. Bunderarchiv, "General Kommando
VIII Fliegerkorps" "Angriffe gegen Russland" (erste Einsatze),
Colonel Lothar von Heinemann, Luftwaffe retired, Federal Republic
of Germany.
44. Interview, Loytved-Hardegg.
45. Interview with General Johann-Adolf Graf von
Keilmansegg, Bundeswehr retired, Bad Kronzingen, Federal Republic
of Germany, 19 January 1980.
46. Interview, Beust.
47. Interview, Poetter.
48. Interview, Loytved-Hardegg..
49. Vladimir Petrov, June 22, 1911: Soviet
Historians and the German Invasion, (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1968), Introduction.
50. Bekker, p. 312.
Contributor
Major Lonnie O. Ratley III (B.A., Florida State
University; M.P.A., Golden Gate University; MA., Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California), is Air Operations Staff Officer,
Directorate of Plans, Headquarters United States Air Forces in
Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. His previous assignments include duty
as an aircraft commander in F-l05, A-7, and F-4 operational fighter
squadrons. Major Ratley is a graduate of Squadron Officer School,
Air Command and Staff College, the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces, and Defense Language Institute, where he specialized in
German.
