During the wartime months of 1941 the Soviet Union found itself at the edge of an abyss. Indeed, until the battle of Stalingrad the likelihood of defeat remained very high. Although the war was a disaster for the peoples of the Soviet Union for its entire duration, the first year and a half proved to be the most difficult. The shattering defeats of this period gave rise to questions about Stalin's responsibility for this catastrophe and about the role played by the structural deficiencies of the Soviet system. None of Stalin's other actions evoked so many pointed discussions in the former Soviet Union as did his leadership in the war, since literally everyone was affected by the nearly total ruination of the country and the death of tens of millions of people.

In the scholarly literature four reasons are usually advanced to explain the colossal failures of the initial period of the war with Germany. The unsuccessful wager on the appeasement of aggression, which found expression in the non-aggression pact with Germany, is particularly emphasized among Stalin's mistakes. A second reason is the extremely low quality of Stalin's military leadership. Stalin did not take into account information from Soviet intelligence on the imminent attack, or warnings from the English and US governments about German military preparations. Without bearing in mind the speed of the German advance deep into Soviet territory, Stalin ordered troops only to attack or to hold their positions. The sole result of this was that approximately...

3.9 million Soviet servicemen were taken prisoner during the first seven months

...of the war, a figure greater than the number of troops the Germans had thrown against the Soviet Union. The third reason for failures was the cumbersome, overcentralized system of administration of the armies, which destroyed local initiative at every level of the chain of command: those commanding armies and divisions were afraid to make independent decisions even when extreme situations arose. Finally, a number of historians have suggested that a fundamental reason for the defeats in the early period of the war was the unwillingness of the people (and above all, Red Army men) to defend Soviet power. In support of this thesis they adduce data on the huge number of Soviet prisoners of war and the friendly attitude toward the Germans on the part of the civilian population in territories that the Wehrmacht occupied. Also mentioned is the regime's clearly expressed lack of confidence in the loyalty of Soviet prisoners of war, who over the course of the entire war were denied the right to defense.

In the Soviet Union the concept of a Soviet prisoner of war, with an acknowledged legal status, did not exist. In the opinion of a number of historians, there is no more eloquent testimony to the regime's lack of confidence in the viability of its own handiwork than such an attitude toward Soviet citizens who had fallen into captivity.

Following this logic, some historians are inclined to see Hitler's inability to exploit the favorable situation and use the dissatisfaction of the Soviet people as one source of Stalin's eventual success, along with Stalin's highly effective policy, which was able to use Russian patriotism and simultaneously depend on the mighty repressive apparatus.

MOSCOW (AFP) May 07, 2005

First WWII wound from June 1941 still fresh for Russian air force Marshal Ivan Pstygo rubs his scarred hands -- memory of a first clash with the Nazis as a young lieutenant in the Moldovan sky on June 22, 1941, and the harrowing flight in his flame-engulfed plane 100- kilometers (62 miles) back to base.

Against a backdrop of model MiG fighter planes, his bronze bust and a portrait in the marshal's uniform, the former airman recalled being thrown into a terrible war at the age of 26.

Speaking in the run up to 60th anniversary commemorations of the end of World War II, he also remembers the Soviet mythology of the war -- and his own take on that official history.

"Of course our troops knew that a German attack was imminent," he affirmed, challenging the widespread idea that the Germans' "Barbarossa plan" had taken the Soviet Union by surprise.

"164 divisions amassed at the borders did not slip by unnoticed. Then there were those who fled to us. We had all the proofs," he said, adding ruefully: "the problem was that we were not at all prepared."

Pstygo had just graduated from air force school -- "four years of study, I was lucky in that: most did not have more than a year of courses" -- and was stationed in Katolsky, near Chisinau, to pilot a Sukhoi-2 bomber.

It was a plane he had never flown. The rest of his comrades were not much better prepared.

"Mixed divisions of Romanians and Germans approached. Our squadron attacked between two mountains," he recalled, mimicking the attack angle of Soviet fighters and bombers, a total of 25.

"We have lost 19 planes in one mission... it was one of the hardest flights in my life," he added as his voice sank.

Once back to the airdrome, the remaining six planes lifted off again.

"Two of my comrades fell before me, they were hit, the plane was on fire and I had to fly it for another 100 kilometers. My hands were burnt. Once landed, I looked at my partner -- he was dead, with 11 bullets in his chest," he remembered.

Ivan then went to report to the battalion's commander, hunched over a map-laden table.

"Ivan, where did you come from? We've already buried you, he told me. Not buried in fact, of course. That was 'missing in action,' but in fact I had come back with 15 comrades," he said with a smile.

Ivan fought in many battles thereafter: Kiev, Kharkiv, Stalingrad.

"They called us 'horseless.' We flew whatever was available. On the whole, we were just retreating," he said.

As for the state of the Red Army in 1941, following a purge by Stalin, Marshal Pstygo -- who earned his title in 1975 -- minces no words.

"An army without a head, without officers: that's what we've had," he fumed in a booming commander's voice. "Three marshals died in battle, but as many were killed before then by Stalin. Army generals? Two were killed, but 12 were shot before the war. Divisions were commanded by captains, organisation was pathetic, we were tripping over each other."

In spring 1942, Soviet troops were surrounded at Kharkov in the eastern Ukraine, without food. "For three days they were kept alive by dry bread dropped over their heads."

"I am not a revolutionary, but they told us lies at the headquarters. They gave numbers like 1,600 planes, but 90 percent of them were still at the factory," he said before evoking the fate of officers sent to Gulag labor camps before the war.

"Two of my commanders were the 'repressed' who came out of the camp to fight. They were shattered men, they were broken in body, all over. But they had superior minds. We would have fought differently, lost fewer men, if we had them earlier," he sighed.

Battles went on. Bryansk, the crossing of Dniepr, the Battle of Kursk -- "a carnage with tanks piled three levels high."

1943 had been "chancy", but he had "loved 1944," right until the victory.

Regrets?

"My comrades, my dead men... and that we did not march on, until the sea, to Spain. Americans had no business in Europe," he said.

In a career of 42 years, he piloted 52 different types of planes and in the 1980s his last of all -- a MiG-23 jet.

At Monday's lavish May 9 World War II victory commemorations, he will be on the official tribune. Or at least he will if his heart permits him.

"They invited us, then they will push us aside," he sighed.