Fallschirmjäger on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 Part IV

by Mitch on February 21, 2011 0 Comments

Diorama by Jaume Ortiz and Daniel Alfonsea

1945 The end is nigh

By the beginning of 1945 the Red Army was poised to conquer Germany. Hitler still preached victory but the situation was deteriorating and victory was not an option.

Only two Fallschirmjäger formations were to fight on the ever shrinking Ostfront. (A favourite saying of Berliners in the first months of 1945 was "soon you'll be able to take a street car from one front to the other").

The 9th and 10th Parachute Divisions were newly raised formations and both were under strength, manpower being at an all-time low.

The 9th was ordered to an area outside the town of Stettin on the Baltic some 100 miles north east of Berlin. The division did not come together as a whole until 8th April, as fragments of its regiments had been fighting on the east bank of the Oder since their inception in January. The Division was formed around splinter groups of Wehrmacht personnel, gone were the days of accepting only the best into their ranks.

In mid-April the 9th Parachute Division was used to help contain a Soviet bridgehead that had been formed on the western bank of the River Oder. They were rushed into action from their area further north.

On the 16th April 1945 the Red Army launched their major offensive to take Berlin. The 9th Division found itself caught up in the most intense artillery barrage of the war so far. The Soviet war machine rolled over the 9th's positions wiping out the 2nd Battalion, 27th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 26th Regiment. The remainder of the Division pulled back only to be overpowered by Soviet armour that managed to break up the formation.

The 26th Regiment found themselves being flung back in a north westerly direction, the 25th Regiment withdrew back towards northern Berlin, the remainder of the Division became subordinated to the 61st Panzer Korps and found itself in the southern outskirts of Berlin.

By late April Berlin was completely surrounded by the Soviets, who were reducing the pocket of resistance in the city day by day. The remnants of the 9th within the city withdrew to the central district, where they aided other splinter groups of SS, Hitler Youth and Volkssturm units to defend the Führer Bunker and surrounding ministry buildings.

All defence was in vain, on the 2nd May 1945, General Karl Wiedling surrendered the city to the Soviets and the remnants of the 9th Parachute Division went into Soviet captivity.

The 26th Regiment, not involved in the fighting for Berlin ended the war fighting the Allies in Schleswig-Holstein, Northern Germany.

Breslau was a city some 200 miles south east of Berlin, it had been turned into a fortress in accordance with the Führer's Festung Befehl (fortress order) and was to be defended to the last man and the last bullet like so many before it.

The 2nd Battalion, 25th Regiment was flown into the city on the 28th February to reinforce the garrison. The city had been surrounded since the 12th January and the Germans knew the city could not fall into Soviet hands as it would be used as a springboard into Berlin. Within a few weeks the 3rd Battalion, 25th Regiment was also airlifted into Breslau as the need for reinforcements became more urgent. As Soviet forces moved in, Breslau turned into a battle ground. The defenders managed to hold out until the 6th May, 4 days after Berlin surrendered. The last remnants of the 9th shared the same fate as their comrades.

The newly raised 10th Parachute Division was originally to be employed in north west Europe but en-route to Holland they were re-directed and sent southeast to southern Austria. Hungary had capitulated and Soviet forces were flooding through the gap in the line defended by Germany's former ally. Army Group South (General Freissner) could not contain the Soviet advance, reinforcements were badly needed.

On the 3rd April, the first units of the 10th Parachute Division arrived in the city of Graz in southern Austria. The 10th like the 9th Division was made up from Wehrmacht splinter groups, mainly Luftwaffe personnel with no aircraft to fly or maintain.

Soviet armour and massed infantry started to split the 2nd Panzer Army and 6th Army who were defending the area. The 2nd Fallschirm-Artillery Battalion was thrown into this split in the line, not with their Artillery but with rifles and machine pistols, they were to be used as conventional infantry.

They took up defensive positions around the town of Feldbach. With the aid of Army anti-tank guns, the Fallschirm-Artillery held back wave after wave of Soviet forces. The anti-tank guns inflecting heavy losses on the enemy armour.

Soviet ground attack aircraft tried to silence the 88 mm guns to give the T-34's a chance. As the Jabo's (ground attack aircraft) left the battlefield the guns resumed their devastating fire, taking their toll on the advancing tanks. Those tanks not destroyed by the 88's were set upon with panzerfaust's and panzerschreck's.

The Paras shot down the accompanying infantry with MG and mortar fire. They held back the assault, but there would be others.

The next assault came very soon, supported by aircraft and the dreaded rocket launchers. Under this superior firepower the 2nd Fallschirm-Artillery Battalion was decimated.

Meanwhile the 30th Regiment and a Battalion each from the 28th & 29th Regiments were based at St.Poelten in the Danube Valley, where they were defending against vigorous Soviet assaults.

They caused heavy casualties on the enemy until the 27th April when the 10th Division was pulled out of the line, with the exception of the 30th Regiment who continued to fight in the Danube Valley.

The 10th was transported by railway to Bruenn in the Sudetenland to join the 18th Army who were fighting for their lives. Once there, they fought as splinter groups, not just against the Soviets but also Partisans, whose small bands of men were causing havoc behind the German lines.

The remnants of the 10th Parachute Division made their last stand to the north of Bruenn, where they were destroyed by the sheer weight of the unstoppable Red Army. The survivors went into Soviet captivity.

The 30th Regiment who had been left in Southern Austria were ordered to withdrawal to Bruenn in the Sudetenland. They could not travel by rail as the Soviets had cut the rail link, they started on foot to reach their objective. En-route they changed direction, knowing that the end of the Third Reich was near. They headed towards positions known to be occupied by the Allies. They managed to surrender to US forces but were subsequently handed over the Soviets to share the same fate as the rest of the Division.

There ended the Fallschirmtruppe's long service on the Eastern Front. Hitler was dead, the 3rd Reich had collapsed after only 12 years. Berlin was in Soviet hands, the war was now over.

The Ostfront had cost the lives of tens of thousands of Fallschirmjäger, men who had survived the harsh Soviet winters and unimaginable deprivations.

The war in the east was over, but the men of the Fallschirmtruppe had made their mark in the bloodiest campaign of the Second World War.

Fallschirmjäger on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 Part III

by Mitch on February 21, 2011 1 Comment

Extract from the memoirs of the Eastern Front by Wolfram von Beck

On 9th November 1943, General Student came to see us and on a sports field near Rome he issued orders for us to move to Russia. The next day we boarded a train from Rome to Zitomir.

When we finally arrived in Russia, we received orders to relieve a Waffen SS unit, which had almost been destroyed during the fighting. I was the staff runner for Leutnant Bickel’s 1.Kompanie. He told me to go and obtain a situation report from the Waffen SS commander. In order to reach the SS command post quickly I decided not to use the road but to follow the sound of guns through a wooded area. When I finally reached the commander he reprimanded me about the absence of my unit. He then showed me which part of the frontline we were supposed to occupy.

In front of his command post sat a Kubelwagen. It was full of men just about ready to leave. I asked the driver if I too could jump on to his vehicle and hitch a ride. He replied that it would not be a problem but asked if I could lift the Unterscharfuehrer so he would not fall off the rear of the vehicle. I was under the impression that these men were wounded. They were not, they were all dead. The Waffen SS never left their dead on the battlefield. Even their wounded men had to march.

I was glad to finally leave this hearse behind me and after reporting back to Leutnant Bickel the Kompanie moved forward into the line. Our position was near a so-called runway, a clearing in the middle of a large forest. On the other side of the runway, Ivan was waiting.

After a day or so we made a dawn attack and drove the Soviets from in front of our positions. Suddenly, we received well aimed fire from a thicket of trees. I quickly noticed the source of fire: the Soviets had removed the lowest branches from the trees so they not only had a good field of fire but also a good view of any attacker.

Myself and a comrade, turned their flank and finished them off from behind. My comrade, a machine gunner was hit. While he was dying he passed me his wallet. All he could say was “Mama, Mama”.

I took the wallet and handed it in to Battalion. I do not know if it ever reached “Mama”.

We were rolling up the whole Soviet trench line but we stopped in front of a soil covered bunker which had not been inspected yet. For good measure we threw in two grenades and after the detonation, three smiling unbruised Soviets came out.

We were surprised that anyone could survive such an attack but we naturally took them prisoner.

Our unit continued the offensive toward the direction of Kirovgrad. Before Novgorodka we found ourselves alone, without friendly units on our flanks. Leutnant Bickel ordered us to build a defensive perimeter on a nearby hilltop for the night. I was now a number 2 machine gunner and the number 1 was my friend Gefreiter Fritz. We dug an emplacement for our machine gun at the front of the hill.

The Soviets suddenly fired several shells from an anti-tank gun, (called a Ratschbumm by the Landser, because the sound of the shot and the hit were almost one). We joked that the Soviets certainly needed some target practice when after one detonation I found an arm and half of my comrades chest in my lap. I lifted Gefreiter Fritz to see if I could help him but he was already dead. I now dug faster and deeper in order to get my machine gun in place.

During this same night, myself and Obergefreiter Zischka, who spoke fluent Soviet, crept up on the enemy positions so he could overhear the Soviets talking. We noted the position of the enemy MG nests and the next morning we attacked, driving the Soviets out of Novgorodka.

I was made machine gunner one and found myself having to hump the MG around during the assault. When Leutnant Bickel needed me again to be staff runner, I was only glad to give the Adolf-Hitler-saw to someone else.

Whilst storming Kirovgrad I was wounded by a round from a Soviet AT gun. I was sent to the field dressing station and on 25th December 1943 I was sent to the Reserve-Lazarett at Meinigen and away from the horrors of Russia only to return again in 1944.

 

1944 A bad year all round for the Wehrmacht

Early in January 1944, the Soviets renewed their operations against the 2nd Parachute Division and 286th SP Brigade in southern Russia.

The 2nd Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 5th Parachute Regiment held a sector around the town of Plavny near Novorodka, either side of the Kirovgrad highway.

Early on the 5th January the Soviets began their offensive against positions held by the 1st Battalion, 5th Regiment. Within half an hour a whole regiment of T-34's had been destroyed with minimal losses to the SP Brigade.

The line held by the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Regiment was broken in several locations as massed Soviet armour broke through the weak line. Soviet tanks broke through east of Plavny and the remaining reserve SP artillery pieces were rushed in to halt the advance. Many T-34's were destroyed by individual acts of heroism using mines, satchel charges and panzerfaust's.

The 2nd Battalion, 5th Regiment was mostly destroyed as massed Soviet forces swept over their positions north of the Kirovgrad highway.

The survivors were rescued by several SP guns who broke through the Soviet forces, where after they successfully withdrew (although it was several days before they turned up at the Divisions lines).

Late on the 5th, the SP Brigade was ordered to Ruptschina where the Soviets had managed to cut the Kirovgrad-Novorodka highway. As they neared their objective they came across a Soviet tank unit in the process of being refuelled. The SP guns along with their Fallschirmjäger passengers successfully destroyed them. By the 6th January, the 7th, 5th and 2nd Regiments had been forced to pull out of the Novorodka area due to mounting Soviet pressure.

They managed to hold a line outside of Kirovgrad denying the Soviets this objective. On the 12th January the survivors of the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment were returned to Germany as they had ceased to exist as a fighting formation.

After the intense fighting around Novorodka, the front around Kirovgrad slipped into stalemate. The remaining guns of the 286th STuG Brigade were transferred elsewhere on the Eastern Front.

The lull in the fighting lasted until March when Soviet forces around Kiev struck southwards toward the 2nd Division's positions. The Paras took up positions around the town of Svenigovodka. They had to withdrawal under pressure from enemy armour. They were kept on the retreat by the ever advancing Red Army and by the last week of March had been forced across the River Bug where they set up defensive positions on the opposite bank. These positions were abandoned by the Paras by the end of March.

During April 1944 the battle weary remnants of the 2nd Parachute Division were pulled out of the line for a short spell of rest and refitting. This was short lived; they were back in action on the 10th May when they were to contain a Soviet bridgehead on the River Dniester.

They suffered heavy casualties during this action and their ranks had been severely depleted. At the end of May the Division was transferred back to Germany for some serious rest and refitting. It was the last time that the 2nd Parachute Division would see action on the Eastern Front. Several weeks later they were thrown into Normandy.

The only other Fallschirmjäger unit to see action in Russia after the 2nd Division left, would be a Fallschirm-Pioneer unit under the command of Major Rudolf Witzig and a Kampfgruppe from the newly raised 16th Regiment under the command of Oberstleutnant Gerhart Schirmer. The 16th was supposed to be part of the 6th Para Division but was detached to the Eastern Front to help deal with the Soviet onslaught.

During the summer of 1944, Army Group Centre had been decimated in Russia's Operation Bagration, their major successful operation in 1944 to coincide with the Normandy landings in the west.

By the middle of July, the Soviets were approaching the Baltic Sea. It was in this area of operations that Kampfgruppe Schirmer were sent, closely followed by the 1st Battalion, 21st Fallschirm-Pioneer Regiment.

On the 25th July 1944, Witzig's engineers took up positions on the road between Dunaburg and Kovno in Lithuania.

This road was defended by the 1st Kompanie, the 2nd & 4th Kompanie's defended a position south of the Dunaburg-Kovno road. Kampfgruppe Schirmer had found themselves trapped around the Lithuanian capital and the Pioneers were to open an escape route for the 16th Regiment back to the German lines.

They were armed with small numbers of panzerfaust's, panzerschreck's, mines and satchel charges. They were supposed to have artillery support but they never received it.

Throughout the night of 25th/26th July, the Fallschirm-Pioneers were subjected to the sounds of Soviet armour being brought up to the front. By the morning of the 26th there appeared a long line of Soviet tanks, there decks awash with Soviet Infantry. Behind the tanks sat row upon row of artillery, howitzers and rocket launchers (Stalin’s Organs).

This formidable line of armour waited patiently for the opening artillery barrage to signal the start of the attack. Inevitably it came and lasted for just over an hour, pounding the Paras positions. When the barrage lifted the tanks rolled forward.

The engineers held their nerve until the tanks were within 50 ft, then they opened up with their anti-tank weapons. Soviet troops were shot down as they disembarked their rides. The pioneers carried out tank busting raids attaching mines and satchel charges on to the advancing T-34's.

The first wave of the attack started to falter, the surviving Soviet armour turned back toward their start line leaving the fields in front of the German positions littered with burned out tanks and dead Soviet infantry.

The 1st Kompanie had suffered heavy casualties during the attack. The 2nd and 4th Kompanie's defending south of the road were not so lucky in holding back the Soviet armour. Several T-34's managed to break through their line. The engineers were now partially encircled, the forward units were pulled back to the town of Dziewaltowe.

When the remnants of the Kompanie's had regrouped, there numbers had been severely depleted. Major Witzig led the survivors of his Battalion through woods outside the town until they reached the relative safety of the main German lines. Small groups of survivors came in several days after Witzig, men who had been separated and were determined to get back.

Major Witzig's Battalion stayed in Russia until October 1944 taking part in several small scale operations. It was then disbanded, with the survivors being sent to other Fallschirm formations.

The remainder of 1944 saw the shrinking of German occupied Russia. German forces were on the retreat back towards the Fatherland. The Red Army was unstoppable, surely the end would come soon.......

Fallschirmjäger on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 Part II

by Mitch on February 21, 2011 0 Comments

1942 Moscow - so near yet so far

Kampfgruppe Sturm held their sector along the River Mius into the first weeks of 1942, during the worst winter so far in the 20th century. They held out against numerous Soviet assaults. Further in the North the situation was worsening. Kampfgruppe Meindl was formed from the 1st Battalion, Assault Regiment under the command of Major Walter Koch, parts of the Artillery Regiment and the Regiment HQ. This small force was sent to an area near the town of Vyasma, 95 miles east of Smolensk.

Kampfgruppe Meindl was joined by splinter groups from decimated SS and Wehrmacht units who had taken heavy casualties in earlier fighting. The Soviet High Command then switched their attacks to the sector held by the 2nd Regiment on the River Mius, near Yuknov. Kampfgruppe Meindl was rushed southwards to bolster the 2nd Regiment. They arrived in time to hold back determined and fierce Soviet attacks. The battles of the Yuknov sector raged on for weeks, with the paras holding back the Soviets inflicting heavy casualties on the attackers. Stavka, the Soviet High Command halted their attacks in the Yuknov sector due to high losses. With the area now secure, Kampfgruppe Meindl was sent North to an area around the River Volkhov southeast of Leningrad to battle against Soviet forces attempting to break into and out of Leningrad.

In March 1942, the 2nd Regiment was moved from the south to the Volkhov front in the north near to the area where their comrades in the 1st Regiment had fought the previous year. When they arrived they were put under the command of the 21st Infantry Division.

The Soviet forces of the Volkhov Front (Meretskov) and the North West Front (Kurochkin) were regrouping their forces for a massive offensive aimed at breaking the German ring in the east of the city of Leningrad.

The 2nd Regiment were located in and around the small town of Lipovka. It was on the 8th May that Soviet forces attacked the town trying to break through to cut an important road west of the town. The paras suffered heavy casualties in the initial Artillery barrage. Masses of Soviet Infantry attempted to break the German line around the town, at some places they penetrated the line but were contained by fierce resistance from the Fallschirmjäger.

On the morning of the 9th May Soviet Jabos (ground attack aircraft) softened up Para positions in and around Lipovka, Soviet Infantry followed up this attack, but were beaten back time and time again by the ever decreasing numbers of determined Fallschirmjäger.

On the 13th May the Paras were reinforced by some tanks and Self Propelled Guns, they managed to plug the gaps in the line created by the Soviets and forced them back to their start lines.

On the 14th May, the remnants of the 2nd Regiment were ordered to counterattack Soviet positions in woods east of Lipovka. (The Para commander Oberst Sturm flew to Berlin to personally complain about this order from the commander 21st Infantry Division to whom they were subordinated, no doubt Goering got to hear of it, but it probably fell on deaf ears).

The initial attack was fairly successful, under cover of an artillery barrage they advanced on the enemy positions, inflicting heavy casualties on the way. As the day wore on the Paras found that they were slowly being outflanked by Soviet forces. They were forced to withdrawal taking their wounded with them. By the evening of the 14th May they were back at their start lines near Lipovka.

During the rest of May 1942, the survivors of the 2nd Regiment were only used on Reconnaissance missions and during June were relieved and sent westwards to rest and refit. Some fragments of the 2nd Regiment remained behind in Russia but by July 1942 the Regiment was back in Germany.

In the summer of 1942 the majority of the 7th Airborne Division was resting and refitting in Normandy, France. It was here that a 4th Regiment was added to their order of battle to make up for the transfer of the 2nd Regiment to North Africa.

It was at the end of 1942 that plans were put together by Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, for an airdrop in southern Russia to capture the important oil fields in that region. This operation was cancelled in September and several detachments from the 7th Airborne (6 Battalions from the 1st, 3rd & 4th Rgt's, a Pioneer Battalion, Artillery, AT & MG detachments) were instead subordinated to Army Group Centre. The Soviets had been concentrating large forces in front of the Army Group's sector with the possibility of launching a massive winter offensive with the aim of driving German forces from the approaches to Moscow.

The 7th took over positions near Smolensk, the scene of many attacks by Soviet forces over the past few months. They were tasked with defending a 56 mile sector north of the Smolensk-Vitebsk highway. It was in the 7th's sector that any Soviet offensive was expected to take place.

The Division carried out many probing missions behind enemy lines to reconnoiter the buildup of Soviet forces facing them. Also during October 1942 they carried out small scale aggressive actions on Soviet positions. The actions of the 7th Airborne paid off as the Soviets chose not to attack their sector but chose those defended by weaker German forces.

It appeared that the Paras would be spending another harsh winter on the Eastern Front. The expected Soviet offensive of late 1942 never came, they were heavily engaged in the fighting to take Stalingrad in the south and it was not possible to mount a second offensive west of Moscow. They were containing the Germans, that was good enough for the time being.

As 1942 came to an end the front seemed inactive, with the Fallschirmjäger of the 7th Fleiger Division only taking part in small scale actions. This lull in the fighting gave the Paras an opportunity for training and building up a good reserve for any eventuality in the future.

 

1943 7th Fleiger becomes 1st Parachute

It was at the end of March that the Soviets opened their offensive on the positions held by the 7th Flieger Division. The usual artillery barrage was followed by massed infantry attacks. This offensive was timed with the expected relief of the division and their transfer west.

General Richard Heidrich, commander 7th Airborne, halted all relief attempts and the Paras stayed on to counter the Soviet attacks. They held out against superior numbers of men and armour and inflicted heavy casualties on the Soviet forces. One battle took place at Lushki where men of the 3rd Battalion, 4th Regiment were holding positions on a hill. The Soviet onslaught was threatening to overun their defense line. The 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment was rushed in to help stabilise the situation. Between the 20th - 27th March 1943 these two Battalion's held back attacks by 2 Soviet Divisions.

High losses to Soviet forces during this offensive led to a decrease in Soviet attacks.

The 7th Airborne Division now renamed the 1st Parachute Division was relieved at the end of March 1943, once General Heidrich was sure that his front was stable. They were transferred west, first to Germany then to southern France where it was to join the newly raised 2nd Parachute Division under the XI FliegerKorps.

The 1st Parachute Division had managed to contain a serious Soviet thrust. Other sectors were not so lucky. At the end of February 1943, just before the main offensive aimed at Heidrich's positions, the 1st Regiment was rushed to Orel some 150 miles south east of Smolensk to help contain a Soviet penetration in that area. They were subordinated to 46th Panzer Korps and fought for three weeks alongside divisions of the 2nd Panzer Army until the breach had been sealed. They too left Russia at the end of March. The only part of the 1st Division to remain in Russia at this time was Kampfgruppe Meindl, which was subordinated to the 6th Infantry Division.

This formation fought around Volkhov and Sobakino in the north. The 1st Battalion, Assault Regiment fought on until April when its survivors were sent back to Germany. The 4th Battalion, Assault Regiment was the last unit of Kampfgruppe Meindl to leave Russia. They fought in and around Volkhov until they too were pulled out of the line in July 1943. July then saw the German defeat at Kursk (Operation Citadel).

The Soviet High Command then succeeded to throw back German forces in southern and central Russia and had managed to create several bridgeheads over the River Dnieper.

The Soviet onslaught continued and all the German forces could do was to try and contain their advances. By November 6th, Kiev fell to the Soviets; by the 14th November Zhitomir was also in Soviet hands.

In early November the 2nd Parachute Division was ordered to move from their base in Italy to Russia, although they were 3 Battalions short due to other commitments in southern Europe. The division was to take up positions near the Soviet held town of Zhitomir and contain any further enemy advances.

The bulk of the Division arrived in its sector between 17th-27th November 1943 under the command of General Gustav Wilke. It was subordinated to 42nd Korps and took up positions east of Zhitomir. The Paras were to relieve the 1st SS Panzer Division. The Fallschirmjäger began to familiarize themselves with the terrain by assisting the SS in an operation to clear a wooded area near Radomsyl.

This assault started early on the 29th November, it met heavy Soviet resistance and was hampered by bad weather of the third winter of Barbarossa.

The next day, a Kampfgruppe from the 2nd Parachute Division started their attack on the Belka woods. The assault was successful in overcoming the stiff Soviet resistance. By the evening of the 1st December 1943, one day ahead of schedule, the 2nd and 7th Parachute Regiments had taken over responsibility of the sector from the 1st SS.

The small German gains in the area began to worry the Soviet High Command. A large Soviet force was assembled north east of Zhitomir with the aim of smashing through the German defences and making for the River Dniester further west.

Men of the 2nd Para took part in the defence of this German line. Wave after wave of Soviet Infantry were mowed down by concentrated MG and mortar fire. Advancing Soviet panzers were destroyed in their columns by tank busting units. The Soviets determined to strive for the Dniester, were undeterred by their huge losses.

The German forces managed to plug the gaps created by the Soviet advance and even went on the offensive to drive Soviet forces back to the River Dnieper.

Further south at Kremechug, Soviet forces broke through the German line held by Army Group A. The 2nd Parachute Division was airlifted on December 15th and flown to Kirovgrad, 80 miles south of Cherkassy (on the River Dnieper).

They were immediately put into the line at Klinzy, several miles south west of Kirovgrad backed by the 11th Panzer Division and the 286th SP Brigade. The 7th Parachute Regiment was to benefit from the SP support when it would counter attack on a 4 mile front in the Kamenka valley.

When the assault opened on the 16th December the Fallschirmjäger managed some minor gains, knocking out several Soviet tanks in the process. The assault faltered later that day due to bad weather. The 17th was spent regrouping forces and preparing for the renewal of the assault on the 18th December.

The first objectives on the 18th were 2 hills heavily defended by Soviet troops. All through the day the Paras pounded the hills with artillery, mortar and MG fire. They successfully took one hill in the evening of the 18th, the second fell early on the 19th.

Their main objective of Novgorodka could not be taken in accordance with their schedule; the SP guns were pulled out of the line for servicing. The 7th Regiment would have to wait until the 21st December to renew their attack.

The Soviets reinforced the town of Novgorodka and the surrounding hills and when the attack resumed on the 21st the Soviet defences were too strong for the Fallschirmjäger to crack. The Soviets were determined to hold the town, no matter the cost in men and material. They threw in thousands of men into the battle only to be mowed down by the Paras. The advance started to falter and by the 23rd December the 7th Parachute Regiment was on the defensive but firmly held on to their weakened line. The Soviets could not break through no matter what they threw at it.

It was the end of yet another year in Russia, another winter. The Wehrmacht had suffered badly on the Eastern Front in 1943, Stalingrad, Kursk, they were on the defensive all along the front. What would 1944 have in store for the Fallschirmtruppe.

Fallschirmjäger on the Eastern Front 1941-1945 Part I

by Mitch on February 21, 2011 0 Comments

"When Barbarossa opens, the world will hold its breath" – Adolf Hitler

 

The opening stages

June 22nd 1941, saw the opening shots of Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s long awaited offensive in the East. A campaign that was estimated would take 8-10 weeks to complete.

In the early hours of 22nd June six thousand Artillery pieces signalled the start of the conquest of the east. Three army groups poured into Russia on a 1500 km front. The Luftwaffe destroyed the Soviet air force on the ground within the first few hours. The Panzer divisions rolled east supported by the Luftwaffe. Mechanized infantry followed, clearing pockets of resistance.

Army group North (General von Leeb) was to pass through East Prussia, the Baltic States and ultimately Leningrad on the Baltic coast.

Army group Centre (General von Bock) was to strike eastwards toward Minsk, Smolensk and eventually Moscow.

Army Group South (Field Marshall von Rundstedt) was to advance southeast to the Ukraine destroying Soviet forces between the Pripet marshes and Kiev, their main objective.

Within days the German forces had captured hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops.

The German advance seemed unstoppable, by the 26th June Army Group North had reached the river Dvina, by the 2nd July they had crossed this major obstacle that formed part of the Stalin line. By the 26th July, Army Group Centre had reached Smolensk. Army Group South took Kiev on the 19th September. There was success after success but the advance was soon to slow down. By the end of August 1941 Army Group North had cleared the Baltic with the exception of the city of Leningrad. The city had become partially encircled by German and Finnish forces. Lake Ladoga, situated to the east of the city became the lifeline for the defenders and population of Leningrad. Hitler had decided on a siege rather than a frontal assault and all but a few Panzers were sent to Army Group Centre for the oncoming drive to Moscow. The pause in the advance gave the Soviet forces time to pull itself together, the cities defences were strengthened. The defenders of Leningrad started to make probing assaults on the besieging German forces, exploiting gaps in the line.

 

1941 The 7th Airborne Division goes east

After the huge losses in Crete, the 7th Flieger Division was ordered back to its bases in Germany for rest and refitting. Operation Barbarossa was to start without the Fallschirmtruppe. This break from battle was short lived. At the end of September 1941 parts of the division were mobilized, ready to be sent eastwards to fight as conventional Infantry. The 1st & 3rd Battalion's, 1st Regiment under the command of Generalmajor Bruno Bräuer and the 2nd Battalion of the Sturm Regiment under the command of Major Edgar Stentzler were sent to the German 18th Army (Army Group North) on the Leningrad front.

Leningrad was situated on the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland, the river Neva ran through it and 30 miles to the east was Lake Ladoga, a huge expanse of water 60-70 miles wide.

The German forces backed by the Finns attacking from the North, had partially encircled the city. The Soviets held some ground on the western side of Lake Ladoga but their foothold was being pressurized by Finnish forces in the North.

Army Group North's battle line was only partial in the east of the city, the Soviets were only willing to exploit this weakly held line.

Facing this line were the troops of the Volkhov Front consisting of several Soviet armies. If they could break through this German line they could hook up with forces within the city who were trying to break through the western side of the line.

The Soviets began the first of several attacks to exploit the weakly held line to link up with Leningrad's forces with the aim of crossing the River Neva.

It was on the River Neva that the first Fallschirmjäger units were to see action on the Ostfront. Units of the 2nd Battalion, Assault Regiment backed up by the 2nd Kompanie of the Fallschirm MG Battalion managed to hold back numerous attacks by Soviet armour and massed infantry. They took heavy casualties in the process. On the 7th October the men of the Sturm Regiment were pulled out of the line to deal with another Soviet attack on a different sector of the River Neva.

The 2nd & 3rd Battalion's, 3rd Regiment under the command of Oberst Richard Heidrich, reached the Leningrad front on the 1st October 1941. They were to provide flank for the newly situated Assault Regiment on the Neva, counterattacking small Soviet bridgeheads.

The 7th Flieger Division's HQ arrived at the front in mid-October and took command of the sector held by the men of their division. Two kompanies of the Fallschirm-Pioneer Battalion under the command of Major Liebach arrived shortly after and went straight into action in woodland on the west side of the Neva.

It was in its woodland area of Ssinyavino that the Soviets had concentrated huge amounts of men and material to try and break through to Leningrad.

The Engineers put up a brave defence in the woods of Ssinyavino, many tanks being destroyed by grenades and mines. Soviet troops advanced en-masse and were cut down by heavy German MG fire. The Fallschirmjäger held back the Soviet onslaught but suffered heavy casualties. On the 16th November the pioneers were pulled out of the line after being relieved, they were returned to Germany to be rested and refitted. By December the Fallschirmjäger in the Leningrad area were pulled out and sent back to Germany.

In the meantime the 2nd Regiment had been in Germany held back as reserve. This was short-lived as they were soon to be mobilized. In November, Army Group South fighting in the Ukraine, was on the defensive. The harsh Soviet winter had set in and the German advance had started to slow down. The Soviets taking advantage of the harsh weather launched attack after attack.

Army Group South found itself over stretched in the Ukraine and there was a serious need for reinforcements. The 2nd Regiment along with the 4th Battalion of the Assault Regiment and one kompanie from the Anti-Tank and MG Battalions were formed into a kampfgruppe and sent to the Ukraine to bolster German forces.

This Kampfgruppe commanded by Generalmajor Alfred Sturm, were ordered to defend a sector along the River Mius around the town of Charzysk. They defended this sector throughout the winter of 1941 and into the early months of 1942. The winter took its toll on Sturms men and heavy casualties were incurred just from the weather.

(3000 Fallschirmjäger were killed, wounded or listed as missing in that first winter in Russia)

The August Pause II

by Mitch on February 20, 2011 0 Comments

The guns of the Black Sea Fleet played a vitally important role in beating back this first German assault on Sevastopol. The battleship Paris Commune, later renamed Sevastopol, is seen in action firing her main armament, 12-inch guns.

 

In early August Hitler flew to Army Group Center to confer with Bock, Guderian, and Hoth. He expressed wonderment at how well operations had gone, considering the Red Army’s surprising strength, and he admitted that Army Group North might not need support from the center. Nevertheless, he again emphasized that the Ukraine and Donets Basin were essential to the Soviet Union’s economy. Interestingly, he foresaw a termination of major operations in the south by mid-September due to rainy weather and in front of Army Group Center by October. Despite the Führer’s lack of interest in Moscow, Bock stressed that only the capital offered the possibility for a decisive victory but emphasized that such a victory would require increased logistical support. Such arguments were academic because the logistical situation remained troublesome; only Guderian’s panzer group had some margin for offensive operations.

 

In the end, however, Hitler decided to strike at the Ukraine despite the fact that the OKH and OKW agreed (for one of the few times in the war) that German forces should concentrate on Moscow. He did concede that Army Group Center could launch an offensive against Moscow before winter, but only after Nazi forces had sealed the Ukraine and established the preconditions for capturing Leningrad.

 

Not surprisingly, the German advance in August was minimal. In the north, Leeb’s forces slowed to a snail’s pace; where they had averaged nearly 17 miles per day before 10 July, they now were averaging one mile. Hoepner argued that Fourth Panzer Group should withdraw from the unsuitable terrain in front of Leningrad (barely 70 miles away) and leave the city’s capture to the infantry divisions.

 

The heaviest fighting occurred in front of Army Group Center. In mid- July Guderian had seized the high ground around Yelnaya as a jumping-off point for Moscow. In late July and August no less than six Soviet armies counterattacked the Yelnaya and Smolensk positions, while eleven Soviet armies attacked Army Group Center’s forces from Velkie Luki in the north to Gomel in the south. Despite Hitler’s interest in the Ukraine, Guderian and his superiors argued that German troops should hold Yelnaya for reasons of prestige. Soviet attacks, often poorly executed, broke with ferocity on troops in the Yelnaya salient; motorized and Waffen SS units of Guderian’s panzer group held the ground until early August, when Fourth Army’s infantry divisions caught up.

 

The conditions of this battle were something the Germans had yet to experience in the war. For example, with no depth to its defenses, the 78th Division held a front of 18 kilometers with no reserves and with Soviet positions right on top of its troops. The result was heavy casualties. Within a four-day period, the division lost 400 men in an effort simply to hold its line; throughout its time in the salient, it was under constant artillery bombardment. By the time the Germans abandoned Yelnaya in early September, the battle had wrecked five infantry divisions. After the war, Marshal Georgi Zhukov claimed German casualties at 45,000 to 47,000 men, an accurate estimate.

 

By 1 September the Germans had suffered 409,998 casualties on the Eastern Front, out of 3,780,000 soldiers available at the beginning of the campaign. Even with replacements, combat units were short 200,000 men. More alarming was the fact that the OKH had already distributed 21 out of its initial reserve of 24 divisions to reinforce the army groups; virtually no reserves remained. The status of vehicles and mechanized units was equally alarming. Only 47 percent of the panzers were in commission; the rest were destroyed, disabled, or deadlined for repair and maintenance.

 

In August Kleist drove First Panzer Group down the right bank of the Dnepr east of Kiev. For the Soviet Southwestern Front, this created a dangerous situation that grew in seriousness as German forces advanced into the Dnepr bend and as Guderian’s panzer group shifted its weight against Gomel. Kiev itself held, but farther east the Germans pushed on both sides of the growing salient. As early as the end of July, Zhukov had urged Stalin to pull back; the dictator refused and relieved Zhukov as chief of staff. Stalin’s hand remained firmly on the helm. Soviet troops in the south would stand and fight where they were.

 

The uncertainties, if not despair, of the last days of June disappeared into a ruthless drive for survival. In mid-July Stalin had reimposed the commissar system on the officer corps. Nevertheless, the same inadequacies that had contributed to the early Soviet defeats still permeated the system. In the far north, tens of thousands of Leningraders dug anti-tank ditches to protect the city, but Soviet authorities refused to evacuate the old and young or to stock provisions for a siege. To do so would have suggested that the front might not hold and could lead directly to the firing squad. Neither soldiers nor citizens of any age could escape the draconian threats of the Soviet system.

The August Pause I

by Mitch on February 20, 2011 0 Comments

German armour on the move at the beginning of a very long journey. Almost everywhere the Wehrmacht achieved tactical surprise. Soviet troops were caught in their camps and barracks and the Germans quickly overran incomplete or unmanned field fortifications.

 

In planning Barbarossa the Germans had assumed that after the initial onslaught and the destruction of the Red Army along the frontier, the Soviets would not be able to field substantial reserve forces—certainly not in any coherent fashion. In late July and August the Germans learned the folly of such ill-founded optimism. By the end of June the Soviets had called up 5.3 million reservists; 13 field armies (a Soviet army was approximate to a German corps) deployed in July, 14 in August, 1 in September, and 4 in October. Units from Siberia and the Far East allowed the Soviets to move 8 additional armies forward in the defense of Moscow, with 10 more arriving in spring 1942. All told, the Soviets deployed 97 existing divisions to the west over summer 1941 and created no less than 194 new divisions and 84 separate brigades.

 

The sheer weight of numbers began to wreck German plans. On 11 August Halder noted, “The whole situation shows more and more clearly that we have underestimated the colossus of Russia . . . This conclusion is shown both on the organizational as well as the economic levels, in the transportation, and above all in infantry divisions. We have already identified 360. The divisions are admittedly not armed and equipped in our sense, and tactically they are badly led. But there they are; and when we destroy a dozen the Russians simply establish another dozen.” Reinforcing Halder’s pessimism were the heavy casualties that panzer divisions suffered in July. For example, 20th Panzer Division had lost 35 percent of its officers, 19 percent of NCOs, and 11 percent of its men by 26 July. Equally disturbing was the higher-than-expected quality of some Soviet military equipment, particularly the T-34 tank, which proved to be extremely effective in combat.

 

The Germans’ operational pause between the end of July and the end of August did not result from Hitler’s and the OKH’s arguments as to whether the next offensive should target Moscow or Leningrad and Kiev. Rather, the Germans halted because of their inability to transport sufficient supplies of ammunition and fuel forward, coupled with the impact of the Soviet Union’s mobilization. As Halder pointed out, Soviet reserves were desperately short of equipment, lacked experienced officers and NCOs, and possessed the barest tactical knowledge, but they provided the manpower for a series of counterattacks that now broke on German spearheads. In early August, Timoshenko, commanding Soviet forces in the center, launched four of these reserve armies (approximately 37 divisions) in a series of attacks that slashed at Guderian’s southern flank. These offensives were uncoordinated and lacked the sophistication to cause anything more than local difficulties. But they forced the Germans to fight, and they drained the ammunition and fuel reserves required for a resumption of the German advance.

 

The farther the German advance attempted to go, the greater became the supply difficulties. Civilian trucks, stolen from Western Europe, disintegrated on the primitive Soviet roads. Within 19 days of the start of the campaign, the Wehrmacht had lost 25 percent of these vehicles with little chance of replacement. The Germans hoped to ease the supply situation by rapidly repairing and converting Soviet railroads to standard European gauge. But there were two significant problems with this plan. First, mechanized units had moved along Soviet roads rather than rails, often leaving the tracks in the hands of Soviet forces. Moreover, the repair and conversion work itself proved more difficult than expected. As early as 29 June, the Luftwaffe had to fly fuel to Fourth Panzer Group. Supply trains to Army Group North, which were scheduled to unload in three hours at the transfer point from German to Soviet gauge, were taking 80 hours. Observers described the resulting traffic jam as catastrophic. Exacerbating difficulties for Army Group North’s spearheads was the fact that its lines of communications (over 400 miles) remained exposed to attacks. By the end of July, ammunition stocks in the divisions and corps had sunk to 50 percent of normal levels and were still dropping.

 

Army Group South’s situation was hardly better. Rundstedt’s troops faced terrible weather conditions—periods of blazing heat and dust followed by torrential downpours. By 19 July, half of Army Group South’s trucks were out of commission. Bitter arguments broke out between units over the hijacking of trains and supplies. On 1 August, within a week of the scheduled push down the Dnepr, Rundstedt’s forward units had between one-sixth and one-seventh of their basic ammunition load. Army Group Center fared equally poorly. By early July Bock’s panzer divisions were losing tanks because the supply system could not provide parts. Combat demands during the closure and destruction of the Smolensk pocket resulted in high ammunition expenditures, while heavy counterattacks by Soviet reserve armies exacerbated ammunition shortages. Fuel supplies had to be curtailed in order to bring up more ammunition. Consequently, Army Group Center could build up only a few supply dumps for a renewed offensive; frontline units fired off ammunition as fast as it arrived; and the troops lived off the land. By the end of July all trains moving supplies forward in Army Group South were turned over to Third Panzer Group for its drive into the Ukraine (still well below its expectations), while trucks from Ninth Army had to drive 300 miles to frontier depots. Stockpiling of fuel for a renewed drive on Moscow never began.

 

Supply problems bedeviled the Luftwaffe as well. By mid-July, its units were seriously short of fuel and ammunition. On 5 July Fliegerkorps VIII reported that fuel had run short, even though it had already scaled back operations. Its commander, Generaloberst Wolfram von Richthofen, noted that “supply is for us the greatest difficulty in this [campaign].” As ground forces spread out in the theater, demands for close air support grew; that in turn resulted in a shuttling of Luftwaffe units from one army group to another. Such shifts strained the supply system even more and almost caused a complete breakdown by late fall 1941. By that time operational ready rates for bomber squadrons in the entire Luftwaffe had fallen below 50 percent, plummeting to 32 percent in December.

 

In the face of such difficulties, the Germans argued the various options among themselves at great length. At the end of July Hitler made clear that his strategic goals remained intact. The Wehrmacht must remove Leningrad and the Soviet forces in the Baltic as military factors, while the Ukraine and the Donets Basin with their reserves of coal must be conquered as well. Hitler could not make up his mind between these two fundamental goals for the campaign. His fixation on Leningrad and the Ukraine suggests that he was uncertain whether the Wehrmacht would achieve victory before winter. At the same time, the OKH and frontline commanders were still urging an advance on Moscow, which they believed would win the war, although their claims then and after the war were not backed with any concrete evidence.