American
Perspectives on Eastern Front Operations in World War
II
Colonel David M. Glantz
Foreign Military Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, KS.
This paper was prepared
for delivery at the first Soviet-American collegium on the problems
of World War II history, held in Moscow on 21-23 October
1986. Thereafter the article was published in the August
1987 issue of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Journal Voprosy
Istorii [Questions of History].
One's view of
historical reality is inevitably flawed. While most historians
strive to preserve or recreate an objective picture of historical
forces and events, a variety of factors affect their work all of
which tend to warp objective reality and produce a subjective view
of history. This process is inevitable, and it poses to the
historian the principal challenge of his profession, a challenge
which he seldom totally overcomes.
One of the most potent
factors affecting objectivity is that of parochialism--in its
milder form simply limited perspective--a narrowness of view
produced by a natural concern for one's own history and reinforced
by the remoteness of events occurring in distant lands.
Parochialism on the part of historians also responds, in part, to
demand - the demand of their reading public who are parochial in
their own right and who seek information concerning their own past.
Cultural and ideological differences that exist between governments
and peoples exacerbate this tendency. These differences color the
interpretation of events and tend to stifle understanding between
peoples already separated by space and time.
The availability of
sources upon which to base historical accounts contributes to the
emergence of a parochial view. A historian must use what sources
are available to him, and if those sources are limited, so also
will his perspective be limited. Good historians will acknowledge
those limitations as they reconstruct the events of the
past.
A more extreme form of
parochialism or limited perspective is bias, which can be either
unintentional or intentional. Unintentional bias is a result of the
same forces that produce a parochial view. Intentional bias can be
a manifestation of the historian's own internal beliefs or the
product of ideological or political influence on the historian from
external institutions, such as governments, religious bodies, or
economic entities. Bias, especially in the deliberate form, creates
a more twisted, and hence more harmful, view of historical events
than simple parochialism. While parochialism implies that a
historian was unable to tap a wide variety of sources, bias
indicates that a historian selected the sources he would use and
ignored those which did not fit into his preconceived notion of
past events. In the former case, distortion of history, although
regrettable, is natural and often hard to detect. In the latter
case such distortion is unnatural, reprehensible, and usually
obvious to the discerning reader.
Few twentieth century events have escaped the effects of
parochialism and bias. Among the more important periods most
severely affected by these phenomena is that of the Second World
War, in particular the war on the Eastern Front--the Russo-German
War. Diverging perspectives, parochialism, and outright bias from
all quarters have obscured or distorted the history of the war and
helped to produce long-standing misunderstandings and animosities.
In fact, it is safe to say that we are still far from achieving an
objective picture of the war, if in fact such a picture is
achievable. The lack of objectivity has left a legacy of
misunderstanding concerning the political and military events of
the war. More important, since perceptions and policies of the
present are based, in part, upon a correct understanding of the
past, many of those perceptions and policies are founded on less
than solid ground.
This paper focuses on
only a narrow segment of World War II experiences --experiences on
the Eastern Front--within the context of the war in general. In
particular, it describes the U.S. perspective on the war and how
events on the Eastern Front fit into that overall view of war.
Further it surveys the forces (sources) that have shaped the
current American perspective on that important segment of World War
II combat, specifically what Americans have been taught or have
read about the war. Finally the paper investigates the accuracy of
that perspective in light of existing source materials. Thus, in
essence, this is a critique of Eastern Front war historiography, a
critique which will hopefully broaden the perspective and
understanding of American and foreign readers and historians
alike.
The American View of World War II
The American view of the war reflected the circumstances
surrounding U.S. involvement in the war as well as long term
historical attitudes toward European politics in general.1 Despite
strong public sentiment for assisting beleaguered Western
democracies, after war broke out in 1939 equally strong neutralist
sentiments blocked active U.S. participation in the war. As the
American public noted with growing concern the fall of France in
1940, the expulsion of British forces from the continent at
Dunkirk, and the struggle for supremacy in the air over Great
Britain, the U.S. government was able to lend assistance to England
short of actually joining the war. The German invasion of the
Soviet Union in June 1941, while lamented as an extension of the
war, in some quarters was also viewed positively as it clearly
diverted German interest from Britain toward what most assumed
would be a more formidable opponent for the hitherto undefeated
German war machine to deal with. Additionally, Germany now faced a
two-front war, and Anglo-Soviet war cooperation against Germany was
bound to ensue. In a sense, the German decision to attack the
Soviet Union strengthened the hand of American neutralists who
could point to the reduced need for U.S. intervention, an argument
quickly silenced by the extensive German advance in the East, which
for a time seemed to threaten the viability of the Soviet Union.
The war itself in the East was a shadowy affair signified by maps
of the Soviet Union overlaid by large arrows and clouds of black
representing advancing Nazi forces. Little detail of the conflict
was available, setting a pattern which would endure during the
future years of war.
Only the brash Japanese
surprise attack on U.S. facilities at Pearl Harbor overcame this
initial American reluctance to become actively involved in war.
This act unleashed American's emotions to an extent that earlier
American lukewarm commitment to the survival of the western
democracies was converted almost overnight into a broad American
commitment to rid the world of the menace posed by the Berlin-Tokyo
axis. While early in the war the U.S. government's principal
concern was for assisting in the defeat of Nazi Germany, the very
fact that the Japanese surprise attack had catalyzed American war
sentiments led to ever increasing U.S. attention to the war in the
Pacific, a war which soon dominated U.S. newspaper
headlines.
The combination of the
U.S. government's focus on defeating Germany "first" and the
reality of fending off Japanese advances in the Pacific set the
tone for the U.S. perspective on the war and focused as well the
attention of the U.S. press and public on those two themes. Hence
U.S. military strategy involved the attaining of footholds on the
European continent as a means for achieving the ultimate
destruction of Germany while the realities of war in the Pacific
and the overwhelming public sentiment to crush the nation which had
provoked the hostilities in the first place drew American forces
inexorably across the Pacific. The competing aims of America's
two-front war, in the end, diluted the government's efforts to
first deal with Nazi Germany and perhaps attenuated the achievement
of victory in Europe. At a minimum, it made the establishment of a
"second front" in Europe a more formidable task and led to the
series of Allied operations in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy,
preceded by a sobering test of Allied capabilities to land directly
in France, conducted at Dieppe in August 1942. Military planners
and the general public alike were transfixed by foreign locales
such as Tobruk, El Alamein, Oran, Kasserine, Palermo, Salerno, and
Anzio where America's military strategy unfolded.
Driven by popular
demand and the inertia of ongoing operations, America's war in the
Pacific in the summer of 1942 changed in nature from a defensive
one to an offensive one complete with alternative strategies for
the defeat of Japan. The names Guadalcanal, Midway, New Guinea, and
a host of hitherto obscure islands dominated U.S.
awareness--governmental and public alike.
It is axiomatic that
where one's forces operate, one's attention follows; and where
one's father, husband, or son fights and possibly dies, dominates a
families thoughts. Human ties usually dwarf geopolitical
considerations, and the piece of the mosaic of war with which a
government or a public is involved naturally becomes the dominant
piece. The remainder of that mosaic, for most remains a shadowy
context of one's own struggle recognized as important only by the
most perceptive of observers.
Thus, America's
perspective on war remained riveted to the path undertaken by
American forces in Europe and across the Pacific. To the earlier
place names of combat were added the names Normandy, Falaise, Metz,
and Aachen in Europe and Iwo Jima, the Philippines, and Okinawa in
the Pacific. As U.S. military efforts increased in scope; and as
Axis power diminished, the impact of those operations on the
American public's memory increased. Throughout this process the war
elsewhere, the real global context for American military
operations, remained cloudy and obscure, the obscurity reinforced
by a lack of specific information as to what was occurring, in
particular at the public level.
The war on the Eastern
Front, however unfairly, was a part of this shadowy context. It is
clear Americans knew in general about the war ln the East. They
knew it was a massive struggle with vast implications for the
success of Allied strategy in the West. The names Leningrad,
Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk were familiar ones, and Americans
could appreciate the impact of Soviet victories at each location.
But that was perhaps of the sum of American understanding.
Certainly, there was little in the American military experience to
condition Americans to conceive of operations as large as those
occurring in the East, and what is not experienced cannot be fully
appreciated. Hence, the tendency of Americans (and others) to
equate Stalingrad with El Alamein and Kursk with Anzio. The
comparison in terms of result (victory) masked the issue of the
contrasting scale and scope of these operations. As the issue of
the second front became a focal point of dispute among the wartime
allies, this context plus the real allied difficulties in effecting
such a landing made the Allied decision to open such a front in
France in 1944 reasonable and understandable to the American
public.2
During the last year of
war the American public's (and government's) attention was captured
by the successful Normandy operation and the ensuing breathtaking
advance across France. Likewise, the German counterstroke in the
Bulge and the 1945 Allied advance into Germany dominated American
public awareness. Concurrent and massively successful Soviet
operations in Belorussia, Rumania, East Prussia, Poland, and
Hungary were noted as part of a continuous, slow, but inexorable
Soviet advance toward Germany. As before, details of the Soviet
operations were lacking, hence they tended to recede into the
background as a adjunct to successful Allied operations in the West
and in the Pacific as well. In a sense, America's attentions were
focused on the two great oceans and operations adjacent to them.
The struggle in continental Europe remained remote, geographically
and psychologically. The same tendency helped to relegate to
obscurity Soviet participation in the final stages of the war with
Japan (the Manchurian operation).3
Thus the war on the
Eastern Front was acknowledged but never fully appreciated in
wartime by the bulk of Allied public opinion. Initially the war
served the function of distracting German military attentions from
England eastward. Later the Red Army locked the German Army in a
struggle which enabled the other Allies to reestablish themselves
on continental Europe. Ultimately, the Red Army joined in the final
victory assault on the German Reich. The American public
appreciated the role played by the Soviet people; and, in fact,
genuine feelings of warmth resulted. Americans, likewise, seemed to
understand the suffering involved in such a struggle. Yet, despite
these feelings, the details of those operations in the East
remained obscure; and, hence, a full realization of their
importance was lacking. This tendency persisted into the postwar
years when it combined with other factors to create a sort of
mythology surrounding the events of the war in the East.
Postwar American Perspective on Eastern Front
Operations
If American wartime impressions of combat on the Eastern Front were
vague and imprecise, there was some improvement in that picture
during the first decade and a half after war ended. However, during
that period a new tendency emerged that colored almost all future
works describing events on the Eastern Front. That tendency was to
view operations in the East through German eyes and virtually only
German eyes. From 1945 to 1958 essentially all works written in
English or translated into English about events on the Eastern
Front were written by German authors, many of whom were veterans of
combat in the East, works moreover, based solely on German
sources.
This German period of
war historiography embraced two genre of works. The first included
memoirs written during those years when it was both necessary and
sensible to dissociate oneself from Hitler or Hitler's policies.
Justifiable or not, the writers of these memoirs did just that and
essentially laid blame on Hitler for most strategic, operational,
and often tactical failures. Thus, an apologetic tone permeated
these works. Officers who shared in the success of Hitler's armies
refused to shoulder responsibility for the failures of the same
armies. Only further research will judge the correctness of their
views.
The first of the
postwar memoirs to appear in English was the by now classic work,
Panzer Leader, by Heinz Guderian.4 Guderian's work, which casts
considerable light on strategic and operational decisions while
Guderian was a panzer group commander in 1941 and later when he
became Chief of Staff in 1944, set the tone for future treatment by
German generals of Hitler's leadership. Guderian laid at Hitler's
feet principal responsibility for all failures of the German Army
and for the dismantling of the German General Staff. The German
General Staff was portrayed as both used and abused by Hitler
throughout the war. Guderian's message was best conveyed by the
chapter heading he chose for the section of the Polish War of 1939
which read, "The Beginning of the Disaster." As in most subsequent
works, Guderian included little Soviet operational data.
One of the most
influential postwar German war critiques was General von
Mellenthin's Panzer Battles published ln English in 1956.5
Mellenthin's work, an operational/tactical account of considerable
merit, echoed the criticism of Hitler voiced by Guderian and showed
how Hitler's adverse influence affected tactical operations. Beyond
this, Mellenthin's work adopted a didactic approach in order to
analyze operations and hence educate officers. Throughout the book
are judgments concerning military principles and assessments of the
nature of the Soviet fighting men and officers, most of which have
been incorporated into the current "body of truth" about Soviet
military capabilities. Hence, Mellenthin made such judgments as
these: the Russian soldier is tenacious on defense, inflexible on
offense, subject to panic when facing unforeseen eventualities, an
excellent night fighter, a master of infiltra- tion, a resolute and
implacable defender of bridgeheads, and neglectful of the value of
human life.6 As was in the case of Guderian, Mellenthin's
experiences against the Red Army encompassed the period before
spring 1944 and reflected impressions acquired principally during
years of German success.
Mellenthln's work,
written without benefit of archival materials, tended to treat
tactical cases without fully describing their operational context.
Opposing Soviet units, as in Guderian's work, were faceless.
Mellenthin's classic account of XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' operations
along the Chir River after the encirclement of German 6th Army at
Stalingrad stands as an example of the weaknesses of his book.7 In
it he describes the brilliant operations of that panzer corps in
fending off assaults by Soviet 5th Tank Army's units which included
first the 1st Tank Corps and later 5th Mechanized Corps. On 7-8
December 1942, 11ch Panzer Division parried a thrust of 1st Tank
Corps at State Farm 79 while on 19 December, 11th Panzer checked
the advance of 5th Mechanized Corps. Despite the vivid accounts of
these tactical successes, Mellenthin only in passing describes the
operational disaster that provided a context for these fleeting
tactical successes. For, in fact, while Soviet 5th Tank Army
occupied XXXXVIII Panzer Corps' attention, to the northwest Soviet
forces overwhelmed and destroyed the Italian 8th Army and severely
damaged Army Detachment Hollidt. Moreover, Mellenthin did not
mention (probably because he did not know) that Soviet 1st Tank
Corps had been in nearly continuous operation since 19 November and
was under strength and worn down when it began its march across the
Chir.8
Similar flaws appear
elsewhere in Mellenthin's work, many of which result from a lack of
knowledge of opposing Soviet forces or their strengths.9
Of equal importance to
Mellenthin's work, but written from a higher level perspective, was
the memoir of Eric von Manstein entitled Lost Victories.10 An
important work by an acknowledged master at the operational level
of war, Manstein's book viewed operations from 1941 to early 1944
at the strategic and operational level. Manstein's criticism of
Hitler reflected active disputes which ultimately led to Manstein's
dismissal as Army Group South commander. Manstein's account of
operations is accurate although again Soviet forces are faceless,
and opposing force ratios are in conflict with those shown by
archival materials of Fremde Heeres 0st (Foreign Armies East),
Gehlen's organizations, and of the OKH (the Army High Command).11
Again Soviet superiorities are overstated.
These three basic
memoirs dominated historiography of World War II in the 1950's and
continue to be treated as authoritative works today even as
unexploited archival materials challenge an increasing number of
facts cited in the three works. Other works appeared in English
during this period but were generally concerned with individual
battles or operations.12 Whether coincidental or not, most of these
unfavorable accounts of Soviet combat performance appealed to an
American audience conditioned by the Cold War years. Notably, few
German commanders of the later war years, a period so unpleasant
for German fortunes, wrote memoirs; and the works of those who did
(for example, General Heinrici) still remain as untranslated
manuscripts in the archives.
The second genre of
postwar works included the written monographs based upon
debriefings of and studies by German participants in operations on
the Eastern Front. For several years after war's end the Historical
Division of USEUCOM supervised a project to collect the war
experiences of these veterans relating to all wartime fronts.
Literally hundreds of manuscripts were assembled on all types of
operations. All were written from memory without benefit of
archival material. The Department of the Army published the best of
these short monographs in a DA pamphlet series in the late forties
and early fifties.
These pamphlets were of
mixed quality. All were written from the German perspective, and
none identified Soviet units involved in the operations. Some were
very good, and some were very inaccurate. All require collation
with actual archival materials. All are still in use and are
considered to be as a valuable guide to Soviet operational
tendencies. A few examples should suffice to describe the care that
must be employed when using these sources.
In 1950 a DA Pamphlet
appeared assessing Allied airborne operations. The distinguished
group of German officers who wrote the pamphlet were directed by
Major General Hellmuth Reinhardt. The pamphlet critiqued German and
Allied airborne experiences. In its chapter on Allied airborne
landings in World War II was a subsection entitled, Reflections on
the Absence of Russian Air Landings, which began with the following
statement:
It is surprising that
during World War II the USSR did not attempt any large-scale
airborne operations. . . its wartime operations were confined to a
commitment of small units.... for the purpose of supporting
partisan activities and which had no direct tactical or strategic
effect.13
The study went on to mention a rumored air drop along the Dnieper
in 1943 but could provide few details of the drop.
A little over a year later Reinhardt discovered his error and put
together another manuscript describing the extensive airborne
operations the Soviets conducted within the context of the Moscow
counteroffensive and adding details to his description of the
abortive Soviet Dnieper airborne drop in 1943.14 Recently the
Office of the Chief of Military History republished the original
pamphlet describing the lack of Russian airborne activity.
Reinhardt's revised manuscript remains unpublished.
A DA pamphlet entitled
German Defensive Tactics against Russian Break-throughs contained
similar errors.15 In a chapter describing a delaying action
conducted between 5-24 August 1943 the authors mistakenly stated
that German forces abandoned the city of Khar'kov on 18 August
when, in fact, the correct date was 23 August.16 Such errors
intermixed with accurate date cast serious doubt on the validity of
these works as a whole. Despite these errors, most the pamphlets
have been reprinted; and they remain one of the basic sources of
data about the Red Army. Moreover, they provided impressions of the
characteristics of the Russian soldier which have become an
integral part of our current stereotype of the Soviet
soldier.
- One of the principal
deficiencies of all genres of German postwar accounts of fighting
on the Eastern Front written during the 1950's was the almost total
absence of Soviet operational data. The forces German army groups,
armies, corps, and divisions engaged appeared as faceless masses, a
monolith of field grey manpower supported by seemingly endless
ranks of artillery and, by the end of the war, solid columns of
armor. The facelessness of these Soviet masses, lacking
distinguishable units and any individually concerning unit mission
or function, reinforced the impression conveyed in these German
works that Soviet masses, inflexibly employed in unimaginative
fashion, simply ground down German power and finally inundated the
more capable and artfully controlled German forces. The Soviet
steamroller plod into eastern Europe leaving in its wake endless
ranks of dead and wounded. That psychological image of the Soviets
portrayed in German works has persisted ever since. Moreover, this
panorama of operations against a faceless foe clouds the issue of
correlation of forces and enables the writers to claim almost
constant overwhelming enemy force superiority, whether or not it
really existed. All of these memoirs and pamphlets appeared before
German archival materials were available, hence they were written
without benefit of the rich archival data on Soviet forces and
operational methods found in these wartime archives.
In the 1960's reputable
trained historians began producing accounts of action on the
Eastern Front. These works were better than the earlier ones but
still lacked balance. They were based primarily on German sources
but did contain some material on the Soviets obtained from German
archival sources. Some were written by individuals who spent
considerable time in the Soviet Union during the war.
Alexander Werth drew
upon his experiences in the wartime Soviet Union to produce Russia
at War and a number of shorter works.17 Although these writings
contained little operational data they did present the Soviet
perspective as they focused on the suffering and hardship endured
by the Russian people and on the resulting bravery as they overcame
those conditions.
Alan Clark's survey
account of the war in the East, entitled Barbarossa, contained more
operational detail.18 However, it still lacked any solid body of
Soviet data. Moreover Clark displayed a tendency others would adopt
- that is to cover the first two years of war in detail but simply
skim over events during the last two years of war. In fact, of the
506 page book, over 400 pages concern the earlier period. This
reflected an often expressed judgment that there was little reason
to study operations late in the war because the machinations of
Hitler so perverted the ability of German commanders to conduct
normal reasonable operations.
The U.S. Army Center
for Military History made a commendable effort to correct this
imbalance by publishing Earl Ziemke's work entitled Stalingrad to
Berlin.19 This work, given the available source material, was a
sound and scholarly one. Ziemke surveyed operations from November
1942 to the close of war, generally from a strategic and high level
operational perspective. While relying on German sources, he based
his research on German archival materials and did include material
from the, by now, emerging Soviet accounts of operations. In so
doing Ziemke expanded the American view of the war in the East and
began to dispel some of the more serious errors found in earlier
German accounts.
Ziemke and others who
followed him with writings on the Eastern Front were helped
immeasurable by Soviet historians work on the war--work which began
in the late 1950's and accelerated in the 1960's. Those new works,
about which I will have more to say later, although of mixed
quality, added a new but essential dimension to historiography of
the war. Most good historians took cognizance of them in their
work. By the 1970's enough of these works existed to provide a more
balanced vision of the war.
In the early seventies
Paul Carell, a German author writing under a pen name, finished
publication of a two volume study of Eastern Front operations
entitled Hitler Moves East and Scorched Earth.20 These works,
written in appealing journalistic style, contained more German
operational detail and tapped numerous accounts by individual
German officers and soldiers who served in tactical units. Although
Carell's works were heavily German in their perspective, they did
contain an increased amount of Soviet materials. Their lively
narrative form has made them influential works among the reading
public.
In a more scholarly
vein, Col. Albert Seaton published two works, The Russo-German War
and The Battle of Moscow which projected Ziemke's work down to the
tactical level.21 By exploiting the official records of particular
German divisions Seaton added a new dimension to the descriptions
of war at the tactical level. Like Carell, Seaton tempered his
German perspective somewhat by using data from a limited number of
Soviet sources.
The works of John
Erickson have been the most influential ones to appear since 1960.
They have broken the stranglehold which the German perspective had
over Eastern Front historiography and have integrated into that
historiography a comprehensive description of the Soviet
perspective on the war, particularly at the strategic and
operational levels. His first work, the Soviet High Command, for
the first time shed light on the events of the summer of 1941.22
His subsequent two books, The Road to Stalingrad and The Road to
Berlin, recounted in considerable detail the course of war from
June 1941 to May 1945.23 The principal value of these works derives
from the fact that they distill information from literally
thousands of Soviet works on the war and create from that
information a detailed, sometimes frenetic, account of operations
in the East. The overwhelming impact of the narrative on the reader
reflects the overwhelming scale and scope of war in the
East.
Erickson's works
critically assess the Soviet sources and reject those that conflict
with the most influential and accurate German records. The
magnitude of Erickson's research efforts precluded his checking on
the accuracy of every tactical detail found in Soviet accounts.
Therefore, in some instances, Erickson's details do conflict with
reputable German accounts. In addition, Erickson has accepted
Soviet data concerning correlation of forces which, in some
instances, have been inflated, in particular regarding German
strength. Dispute these minor faults Erickson's effort to produce a
Soviet view of the war has accomplished the major feat of providing
readers with more balanced sources upon which to reach judgments
concerning combat in the East. Unfortunately the size and
complexity of Erickson's works precludes their appeal to a broad
readership among the general public. Future historians will have
the task of integrating Erickson's view with those of the host of
other memoir writers and historians who wrote from the German
perspective.
Across the span of time
from 1945 to the present, despite the work of Erickson and a few
others, the German view of war on the Eastern Front has
predominated. In part, this has resulted from a natural American
parochialism that tended to discount or ignore the importance of
operations in the East in the overall scheme of war. During the
earlier postwar period the German view prevailed by default.
Numerous German accounts appeared, and nothing in the way of Soviet
material appeared to contradict them. By the 1960's, when Soviet
accounts began to appear, the German view was firmly entrenched.
Moreover, the cold war atmosphere often prompted out of hand
rejection of the Soviet version of war. The German view, sometimes
accurate, often apologetic or accusative, and usually anti-Soviet,
prevailed. As a result, this view was incorporated into high school
and college textbooks and into the curriculum of U.S. military
educational institutions. Most important, is provided a context
within which to judge the contemporary Soviet military. Only today
is that view increasingly being challenged. Those challenges are
made possible by intensified Soviet publication efforts, efforts
that are slowly raising from obscurity details of Soviet operations
on the Eastern Front. These Soviet publication efforts, however,
must overcome serious barriers if they are to produce a view which
can complement the German perspective and produce a more balanced
picture of war on the Eastern Front.
Soviet Sources: Perceptions and Reality
American perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front have been
shaped in part by the course of Soviet historiography on the war.
As stated earlier, the Soviet reticence of address operations in
detail during the immediate postwar period left the field open for
the German perspective, which in turn predominated. Soviet efforts
to set the record straight began in the late 1950's and continue
today but have only partially tempered that German view.
Three principal
barriers exist to block or inhibit Soviet historical efforts from
influencing the American perspective. The barriers are, in
sequence: a lack of knowledge in the West concerning Soviet
historical work, the language barrier, and a basic distrust of the
credibility of Soviet works. The first two of these barriers are
mechanical and can be easily addressed. The third is more
fundamental and more difficult to overcome.
Most Americans and
Westerners are soon unaware of the scope of Soviet historical
efforts. They assume that the Soviet reticence to talk openly of
operational matters, characteristic of the period prior to 1958,
continues today. In fact, Soviet historical efforts have increased
geometrically, and Western audiences need to be educated to that
fact. The fact that most of these works are only in Russian
inhibits that education. To remedy this problem more Americans need
to learn Russian (an unlikely prospect), or more Soviet works will
have to appear in English. Increased research by American military
historians using Soviet sources can also contribute to overcoming
this first barrier. The second barrier is a physical one regarding
language. If a source cannot be read, it makes little difference
whether or not it is available or, for that matter, credible. The
only remedy to this barrier is more extensive translation and a
publicizing of Soviet sources by their use in more detailed
historical monographs.,
The third barrier,
involving credibility, is more fundamental. It is, in part, an
outgrowth of ideological differences which naturally breed
suspicion on the part of both parties. It is also a produce of the
course of Soviet war historiography which itself is subject to
criticism, depending on the period during which the Soviet sources
appeared.
In the immediate
postwar years, from 1945 to 1958 few Soviet military accounts
appeared about operations on the Eastern Front.24 Those that did
appear were highly politicized and did not contain the sort of
operational detail which would make them attractive to either the
casual reader or the military scholar. Indeed, they were of little
use to the military student (Soviet or foreign), which may, in
part, explain their paucity of accurate detai1.
Beginning in 1958 more
accurate and useful accounts began appearing in a number of forms.
From its inception, Soviet Military History Journal has Bought to
publish high quality articles on relevant military experiences at
all levels of war.25 The journal after 1958 immediately began
investigation of a series of burning questions, perhaps the most
important of which was an investigation of the nature of the
initial period of war, (Nachalny period voini), a topic noticeably
ignored in earlier Soviet work. Military History Journal has since
focused on practical, realistic questions within a theoretical
context. It has personified the Soviet penchant for viewing
military affairs as a continuum within which individual issues must
be viewed in a historical context.
In 1958 the first
Soviet general history of the war appeared, Platonov' History the
Second World War.26 This volume, for the first time, addressed
Soviet wartime failures which had been almost totally overlooked in
earlier years. For example, it openly referred to the abortive
Soviet offensive at Khar'kov in May 1942, a subject hitherto
apparently too sensitive to talk about. Platonov offered few real
details of these failures but did break the ice regarding a candid
reference to failures in general which represented a quantum leap
in the candor of Soviet sources.
At the same time Soviet
authors resumed a wartime tendency to teach by use of combat
experience. Kolganov's Development of Tactics of the Soviet Army in
the Great Patriotic War, published in 1958, contained a thorough
review of wartime tactics by combat example.27 This didactic work
sought to harness experience in the service of education and did so
by drawing upon a wealth of tactical detail, some of it relating to
failure as well as success. Kolganov's accounts, although
fragmentary, seemed to affirm a Soviet belief that one learns from
failure as well as success; and, if one is to be educated correctly
(scientifically), details must be as accurate as possible in both
cases.
After 1958 a flow of
memoir literature, unit histories, and operational accounts began
that has continued, and, in fact, intensified, to the present. The
Soviets have sought to capture the recollections of wartime
military leaders at every level of staff and command. These include
valuable memoirs of individuals at the STAVXA level (Shtemenko,
Vasilevsky, Zhokov), front level (Rokossovsky, Konev, Meretskov,
Yerememko, Bagramyan), army level (Moskalenko, Chuikov, Krylov,
Batov, Galitsky, Grechko, Katukov, Lelyushenko, Rotmistrov), and at
the corps level and below.28 Soviet military historians have logged
the experiences of many Soviet units including armies, tank armies,
corps (tank, mechanized, and rifle), divisions, and even regiments
and separate brigades, although with a few notable exceptions.29
Memoir literature has also extended into the realm of the
supporting services (air, navel, engineer, signal, etc).
Over time some
excellent operational studies have appeared focusing on major
operations (Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, Belorussia), on lesser
operations (Novgorod-Luga, Eastern Pomerania, Donbas), and on
specific sectors in larger operations.30 Written by academic
historians (Samsonov) or military historians (Zhilin, Galitsky,
Sidorenko) many of these are first rate works containing massive
amounts of, for the most part, accurate detail. Building upon the
memoirs, unit histories, and operational studies were valuable
functional works which distilled the sum total of those
experiences. These studies included general military histories and
histories of operational art (Semenov, Strokov, Bagramyan,
Krupchenko), operational and tactical studies based on combat
experiences (Radzievsky, Kurochkin), studies on the use of armored
and mechanized forces (Rotmistrov, Babadzhanyan, Radzievsky,
Losik), treatices on operational art and tactics (Sldorenko,
Savkin, Reanichenko), and studies on numerous other topics relating
to combat support.31
New general histories
of the Great Patriotic War and World War II, have appeared since
1960. A six volume history of the war in the East provided a more
candid view of political issues of the war than earlier war
histories and added some operational details hitherto not
revealed.32 Its size, however, limited coverage of lower level
operational or tactical detail. An eleven volume history of World
War II was politically less candid but did add another measure of
detail to accounts at the strategic and operational
levels.33
Thus it is apparent
that massive amounts of Soviet military data concerning operations
on the Eastern Front do exist. Moreover, the sum total of that
information, as Erickson has demonstrated, forms an impressive
picture of operations in the East. On balance much of that
information is accurate as well.
There are however, some
problems with these sources, just as is the case with German
sources, that must be critiqued if one wishes to prevent creating a
Soviet bias similar to the earlier German bias I
described.
First, Soviet works
tend to contain a high political or ideological content. In
essence, they are intended to indoctrinate as well as teach. In
theory, of course, war, in all its detail, is a continuum of the
political and, hence, ideological context. Thus the political
content is understand- able, if not obligatory. A critical reader
must recognize what is political and what is not and must not allow
his judgment of the one to affect his judgment of the other. He
must also realize that many of these works, especially the briefer
and more popular ones, are written to inspire. Thus, interspersed
with operational and tactical fact are inevitable examples of
individual or unit self sacrifice and heroism (which may or may not
be accurate). The tendency of the Western reader is to note the
often romanticized single act and reject also the account of action
surrounding it.
Soviet military works
written before 1958 were highly politicized and focused heavily on
the positive role of Stalin in every aspect of war.34
Correspondingly, operational and tactical detail was lacking. After
1958 the political content of military works diminished as did
emphasis on the "cult of personality," leaving more room for
increasing amounts of operational and tactical detail. Since that
time the political content of military works has varied depending
on the nature of the work and the audience it intended to address.
Hence the briefer the article and the less sophisticated the
audience, the higher was the political content. First-rate
operational and tactical studies limited political coverage to the
role of the party structure in planning and conducting
operations.
Soviet military writers
also have tended to accentuate the positive, to cover successful
operations in more detail than unsuccessful ones. Thus, until
recently, little was written about the border battles of June-July
1941, about the Khar'kov and Kerch operations in May 1942, about
the Donbas and Khar'kov operations of February-March 1943, and
about the warning stages of many successful operations.35 Likewise,
few unit histories have appeared of armies which operated on
secondary directions in the period 1943-1945.36
The Soviets in the
early sixties began noting these failures, saying, for example,
that in May 1942 Soviet forces launched an offensive at Khar'kov
but the offensive was unsuccessful. This is certainly correct but
not very helpful to one who wishes to learn from failures. As time
has passed more material has appeared concerning these failures
(for example, a chapter from Moskalenko's Na yugozapadnom
napravlenil (On the southwestern direction) provides considerably
more detail on the Khar'kov disaster.
A similar pattern
emerged in Soviet treatment of their own airborne experiences,
which were notable for their lack of success. There were few
references to those failures prior to 1964. Yet by 1976 most of the
unpleasant details were public, although romanticized a
bit.
Very naturally Soviet
interpretation of operations have often differed sharply from the
German. In fact, over time differences in interpretation have
appeared within the circle of Soviet military writers. In the case
of memoir material this takes the form of debates over the
rationale for and the outcome of operations - debates conducted by
competing memoirs.37
One is struck in Soviet
accounts by the accuracy of facts, principally concerning unit,
place, and time. Soviet sources in this regard invariable match up
with the operational and tactical maps found in German (or
Japanese) unit archives. It is apparent in some cases that Soviet
military historians have made extensive use of such German archival
materials in preparing their own studies.38 Less unanimity exists
over what actually occurred at a given place and at a given time.
Just as is the case in some German accounts, towns abandoned by the
enemy were "taken after heavy fighting," and units driven back in
disarray simply "withdrew to new positions."39
Especially striking are
those frequent cases where low level Soviet accounts precisely
match German accounts. In a history of the 203rd Rifle Division the
author described the operations of that unit in the frenetic
post-Stalingrad days of December 1942 when Soviet forces pressed
German units southward from the Don and Chir Rivers toward the rail
line running from Tatsinskaya to Morozovsk.40 The 203rd Rifle
Division was ordered to advance by forced march about 50
kilometers, cross the Bystraya River, and reach an encircled Soviet
armored force at Tatsinskaya. The author described the action as
the worn division, by now running short of ammunition, reached the
ridge line north of the Bystraya. There it confronted an advancing
force of German armor and infantry dispatched north of the river.
The German force, estimated at 15 tanks, struck two regiments of
the 203rd Rifle Division which, because of ammunition shortages,
were forced to withdraw several kilometers. Just as he was fearing
for the fate of his division the Soviet divisional commander
contacted a nearby antitank company which provided the division
supporting fire. Miraculously the German force broke contact and
withdrew south of the river. This Soviet account did not mention
the designation of the German unit.
In a casual interview
with a former lieutenant from 6th Panzer Division, which fought
along the Bystraya River in late December 1942, I asked the
lieutenant about his unit's operations on the day of the events
described by the Soviet account.41 He responded that 6th Panzer
dispatched an armored kampfgruppen north of the Bystraya with about
15 tanks and supporting infantry in order to disrupt the Soviet
advance to and across the river. He was in the task force. The
force struck a Soviet unit, elements of which withdrew after
desultory firing. The German unit pursued a short distance until it
came under fire from an undetected Soviet artillery unit, fire
which stripped the infantry away from the tanks. Fearing the loss
of critical armored assets left unprotected by infantry, the
Germans withdrew south of the river.
This isolated incident
is often typical of the complementary nature of Soviet and German
(and Japanese) accounts regarding unit, place, and time. It also
vividly underscores the necessity, or at least the desirability of
having both sides of the story.
A major discrepancy
between Soviet and German sources concerns the number of forces at
the disposal of each side. Examination of both sources and German
archival material indicates several tendencies. First, Soviet
accounts of their own strength seem to be accurate and reflect the
numbers cited in documentation of Fremde Heeres 0st.42 Conversely,
Soviet sources tend to exaggerate the strength of German forces
they opposed. Moreover, Soviet exaggeration of German strength
regarding guns and armor is even more severe than in regards to
manpower. In part, this results from the Soviet practice of
counting German allies, auxiliary forces, and home guards
(Volksturm) units. But even counting these forces, Soviet estimates
of German strength, when compared with the strengths shown by OKH
records, are too high.43 Just as the Germans exaggerate when they
cite routine Soviet manpower preponderance of between 8:1 and 17:1,
so also do Soviet sources exaggerate Soviet-German strength ratios
as being less than 3:1 and often 2:1 up to 1945 when higher ratios
were both justified and recognized by Soviet sources. For example,
the Japanese armored strength of about 1500 tanks cited in Soviet
works on Manchuria exceeded tenfold the actual Japanese armored
strength, which, in addition, was comprised of armored vehicles
scarcely deserving of the name (and apparently, for that same
reason, never used in the operation).
Soviet sources also
adversely affect their own credibility with regards to wartime
casualty figures. The earlier practice of totally ignoring
casualties has begun to erode, but one must look long and hard to
find any loss figures, indicating that this is still obviously a
delicate question for Soviet writers. Gross figures do exist for
large scale operations (Berlin, S.E. Europe, Manchuria), and one
can infer casualties from reading divisional histories which
sometimes give percentages of unit fill before and after operations
and company strengths.44 Comprehensive coverage of this issue,
however, does not exist; and the reader is left to reach his own
conclusions (One of which is that the Soviet author has something
to hide).
Thus, in addition to
the general American (and Western) ignorance of the existence of
Soviet source material and the presence of an imposing language
barrier, Americans question the credibility of Soviet sources.
While this questioning was once valid, it is increasingly less
valid as time passes. Soviet sources have some inherent weaknesses;
but these weaknesses, over time, have been diminishing.
Unfortunately, the American perception of Soviet sources remains
negative; and, hence, the American perception of the Eastern Front
has changed very little. Only time, more widespread publication of
candid operational materials (some of it in English), and more
extensive use of those materials by American military historians
will alter those perceptions. That alteration will likely be
painfully slow.
Conclusions: The Reconciliation of Myths and
Realities
The dominant role of German source materials in shaping American
perceptions of the war on the Eastern Front and the negative
perception of Soviet source materials have had an indelible impact
on the American image of war on the Eastern Front. What has
resulted in a series of gross judgments treated as truths regarding
operations in the East and Soviet (Red) Army combat performance.
The gross judgments appear repeatedly in textbooks and all types of
historical works, and they are persistent in the extreme. Each lies
someplace between the realm of myth and reality. In summary, a few
of these judgments are as follows:
- Weather repeatedly frustrated the fulfillment of German
operational aims.
- Soviet forces
throughout the war in virtually every operation possessed
significant or overwhelming numerical superiority.
- Soviet manpower
resources were inexhaustible, hence the Soviets continually ignored
human losses.
- Soviet strategic
and high level operational leadership was superb. However, lower
level leadership (corps and below) was uniformly
dismal.
- Soviet planning
was rigid, and the execution of plans at every level was inflexible
and unimaginative.
- Wherever
possible, the Soviets relied for success on mass rather than
maneuver. Envelopment operations were avoided whenever
possible.
- The Soviets
operated in two echelons, never cross attached units, and attacked
along straight axes.
- Lend lease was
critical for Soviet victory. Without it collapse might have
ensured.
- Hitler was the
cause of virtually all German defeats. Army expertise produced
earlier victories (a variation of the post World War I stab in the
back. legend).
- The stereotypical
Soviet soldier was capable of enduring great suffering and
hardship, fatalistic, dogged in defense (in particular in
bridgeheads), a master of infiltration and night fighting, but
inflexible, unimaginative, emotional and prone to panic in the face
of uncertainty.
A majority of Americans
probably accept these judgments as realities . In doing so they
display a warped impression of the war which belittles the role
played by the Red Army. As a consequence, they have a lower than
justified appreciation for the Red Army as a fighting force, a
tendency which extends, as well, to the postwar Soviet Army. Until
the American public (and historians) perception of Soviet source
material changes, this overall perception of the war in the East
and the Soviet (Red) Army is likely to persist.
Close examination of
Soviet sources as well as German archival materials cast many of
these judgments into the realm of myth. Recent work done on Eastern
Front operations has begun to surface the required evidence to
challenge those judgments.45 Continued work on the part of American
historians, additional work by Soviet historians, joint work by
both parties, and more extensive efforts to make public Soviet
archival materials is necessary for that challenging process to
bear fruit.
It is clear that no
really objective or more complete picture of operations on the
Eastern Front is possible without extensive use of Soviet source
material. Thus definitive accounts of operations in the East have
yet to be written. How definitive they will ultimately be depends
in large part on the future candor and scope of Soviet historical
efforts.
In the interim it is
the task of American historians, drawing upon all sources, Soviet
and German alike, to challenge those judgments and misperceptions
which are a produce of past historical work. It is clear that the
American (Western) perspective regarding war on the Eastern Front
needs broadening, in the more superficial public context and in the
realm of more serious historical study. Scholarly cooperation among
Soviet and American historians, research exchange programs
involving both parties, and expanded conferences to share the
fruits of historical research would further this end and foster
more widespread understanding on both sides.
Endnotes
1. This view is drawn from a review of newspaper coverage of the
war by the New York Times but, more important, by local newspapers
as well. It is also based on ten year's experience in teaching and
listening to a generation of postwar students at the U.S. Military
Academy, The U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the
U.S. Army War College.
2. Despite efforts by
the Communist Parties of the United States and Great Britain to
publicize the Soviet role in war.
3. Americans also
believed, and still believe, the use of the atomic bomb in early
August 1945 rendered Soviet operations in Manchuria
superfluous.
4. H. Guderian, Panzer
keader, (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1957) First edition published in
1952.
5. F. von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second
World War, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972) First
edition published in 1956.
6. Ibid., 185-186, 209,
233-234, 292-304. Mellenthin did, however, note the tremendous
improvements in Soviet armored capability during wartime and noted,
"The extraordinary development of the Russian tank arm deserves the
very careful attention of students of war."
7. Ibid.,
175-185.
8. One of the few
Soviet accounts of action along the Chir River is found in K. K.
Rokossovsky, ea., Velikaya pobeda na Volge (The Great Victory on
the Volga), (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1960), 307-309. An indicator of
reduced 1st Tank Corps strength is apparent from German situation
maps, see Lagenkarte XXXXVIII Pz-Kps, 7.12.42 through
12.12.42.
9. Particularly in
Mellenthin's brief account of operations in the Donbas in February
1943. The map and text provide incorrect positions for two
divisions of II SS Panzer Corps.
10. E. von Manstein,
Lost Victories, (Chicago, Ill: Henry Regnery, 1958).
11. Manstein cites
force ration as being 8:1 in favor of the Soviets opposite Army
Groups Don and B and 4:1 against Army Groups Center and North.
Fremde Heeres 0st documents dated 1 April 1943 give the ratios of
just over 2:1 against Army Groups South and A and 3:2 against Army
Groups Center and North. The overall German estimate of Soviet
superiority on that date was just under 2:1. See Fremde Heeres 0st
Kraftegegenuberstellung: Stand 1.3.43.
12. For example, H.
Schroter, Stalingrad, (London: Michael Joseph, 1958).
13. DA Pamphlet No.
20-232, Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal, (Department of the
Army, October 1951), 36.
14. H. Reinhardt,
"Russian Airborne Operatio
