Soviet production of new submarines began in 1927. Clandestine cooperation with Germany gave Soviet engineers access to design data for German types from late World War I: minelayers, Type UBIII, and Mittel-U. The Soviets salved and recommissioned the sunken British submarine L-55, which gave them access to late-war British design information. Soviet designers also gained considerable data from rehabilitating the later czarist-era Bubnov-designed boats and the final examples of the ubiquitous Holland H-type submarines. Synthesizing this information permitted the Soviets to produce a wide variety of submarines on a large scale. There were two basic series of “M”-type coastal submarines, two basic medium submarine series—the “Shch” or Pike type of indigenous origin (though strongly influenced by British practice), and the later “S”-type derived from the same basic design as the German Type VII, minelayers of the “L”-type developed from the L-55, and long-range boats of the “K”-type. At the outbreak of World War II in September 1939, the Soviet Union deployed the world’s largest submarine force, with 168 boats in service.

The final “M”-type displaced 283 tons surfaced, had a range of 4,500 miles at 8 knots on the surface or 36 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 295 feet, and had a battery of 2 torpedo tubes with 4 torpedoes and a 45mm antiaircraft gun. The developed “S”-type displaced 856 tons surfaced, had a range of 9,500 miles at 9 knots on the surface or 45 hours at 3 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and had a battery of 6 torpedo tubes with 12 torpedoes and a 4-inch deck gun. Their indigenous rivals displaced 587 tons, had a range of 3,650 miles at 7 knots or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 295 feet, and carried 6 torpedo tubes with 10 torpedoes. The minelayers displaced 1,108 tons, had a range of 10,000 miles at 8.6 knots or 60 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and carried 8 torpedo tubes with 14 torpedoes and 20 mines. The “K”-type were very popular with their crews and were regarded as the best Soviet submarines of World War II. They displaced 1,480 tons, had a range of 15,000 miles at 9 knots or 50 hours at 2.5 knots submerged, could dive to 330 feet, and carried 10 torpedo tubes with 24 torpedoes. Despite this variety, the Soviet Union’s yards produced large numbers of submarines during World War II, completing some 200 boats during the course of the conflict.

SERIES XIV (1938) “K” class

K-1 (29 April 1938), K-2 (29 April 1938), K- 3 (31 July 1938), K-56 (29 December 1940), K-55 (7 February 1941), K- 54 (March 1941), K-57 (1946)

Builder: Admiralty K-22 (4 November 1938), K-23 (28 April 1939), K-52 (5 July 1939), K-51 (30 July 1939), K-21 (14 August 1939), K-53 ( 2 September 1939), K-24 (1940)

Builder: Baltic K-58, K-60, K-77, K-78 (1946)

Builder: Zhdanov

Displacement : 1490 tons (surfaced), 2140 tons (submerged)

Dimensions: 320940 x 24930 x 149100

Machinery: 4 diesel engines, 2 electric motors, 2 shafts. 8400 bhp/2400 shp = 21/10 knots

Range: 14,000 nm at 9 knots surfaced, 160 nm at 3 knots submerged

Armament: 10 x 533mm torpedo tubes (6 bow, 2 stern, 2 trainable external mounts), total 24 torpedoes, 20 mines, 2 x 100mm guns, 2 x 45mm AA guns Complement: 60

Mikhail Alekseevich Rudnitskiy designed these large double-hull cruiser submarines. In addition to mines laid through two vertical tubes amidships, these boats originally were to carry a seaplane in a hangar abaft the conning tower, but the aviation proposal was abandoned. These submarines performed well and were the best Soviet-designed boats in service during World War II. All the class operated with the Northern Fleet. One additional boat building at Leningrad was not completed because of the German siege.

The K- 22 was mined off Cape Harbaken on 6 February 1942; the K-23 was lost off Okse Fjord on 12 May; the K- 2 failed to return from a patrol off the Norwegian coast in September. The K-3 was lost off Batsfjord on 21 March 1943, and the K-1 probably was mined in the Kara Sea in October. The surviving boats were stricken in the late 1950s, and the K-21 became a memorial at Severomorsk.

Captain Lunin

K-21

According to citations from captain Lunin's report - at 16:55 sonarman detected far unclear sounds, at 17:00 the deck-house of submarine was detected by watch officer via periscope and soon it became clear that was not submarine but the bridge of one of escort destroyers, at 17:15 Lunin detected battleship, heavy cruiser and 8 destroyers from ~30 cables [in reality those were battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 7 destroyers and 2 torpedo boats], the attack was performed at 18:01 from 18-20 cables by 4 torpedoes with time gaps 4 sec; in 135 sec soundman heard two explosions, at 18:31, 18:32 and 18:38 long explosions were detected which continued 20 sec each. The periscope was raised at 19:05 and there were no any ships on the horizon.

HQ officers supposed after analysis that all torpedoes missed because of errors in determination of target course angle and speed, the same did historians later [speed of Tirpitz was 24 knots and Lunin calculated it as 22 knots, target course angle was 90 degrees and Lunin calculated it as 60 degrees]. If Lunin used time gaps in torpedo salvo not 4 sec but 14 sec he could hit the target with high possibility [probably, he didn't want to stay at periscope depth too long]. In principle, such torpedo fire [90 degrees of target course, angle, distance 18-20 cables and speed 22-24 knots] was prohibited by Soviet naval manuals as useless and Lunin, probably, just wanted to use at least small chance.

The explosion heard at 18:04 was explosion from self-exploded torpedoes after their maximal run, explosions between 18:31-18:38 were from depth charges of German destroyers which detected British submarine. Germans didn't detect K-21 and couldn't hear explosions from missed torpedoes so they got info about attack against "Tirpitz" only after interception of radio message from the Soviet submarine.

Prof. Platonov doesn't mention in his excellent book that "Tirpitz" was among official claimed hits of K-21. Even Dmitriev [Soviet-era historian] who described the "combat" between K-21 and Norwegian fishing motor boats as combat between K-21 and German anti-submarine vessels mentioned only that K-21 attacked very powerful German battleship "Tirpitz" using stern torpedo tubes and there are no words about any hits.

The fact that submarine attacked "Tirpitz" was very important itself that time [especially the radio message from K-21 which was intercepted by British convoy and Germans] - the visibility and sea state were very good so Lunin could raise periscope only for very short period of time [and that caused mistakes in the definition of distance and target course angle - as the result Lunin fired from stern tubes under very disadvantageous position], Lunin (as well as all other Soviet submarine commanders) had absolutely no experience in attack of large high-speed warship guarded by strong escort and performed anti-submarine manoeuvring [and he did that for the first and single time during the war among Soviet submarines], Lunin also didn't know the abilities of modern German anti-submarine weapons and he was afraid for his submarine and crew too much.

Translated from Russian.

Naval Infantry.

Heavy cruiser Maxim Gorky at Leningrad 1942.

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet (Krasnoznamyonnyy Baltiyskiy Flot, KBF) suffered heavy losses during the evacuation of Tallinn on 28/29 August, but by the beginning of the siege of Leningrad it still had enough warships left to provide considerable naval gunfire support to Soviet ground troops. The heavyweights were the battleships Marat and October Revolution, each with 12 305mm guns that could hurl 470kg high-explosive shells out to 24km, and the heavy cruisers Kirov and Maxim Gorky, each with nine 180mm guns that could fire 97kg shells out to 33km. Additionally, the incomplete heavy cruiser Petropavlovsk (ex-Lutzow), purchased from Germany in 1940, had two operational 8in. gun turrets. The KBF also had seven operational Gnevny-class destroyers, as well as a number of smaller warships. In addition, the KBF operated a railway battery with four 180mm guns, as well as a naval test range near Toksovo that had a single 406mm gun, a 356mm gun and two 305mm guns. Once the Germans mined the Gulf of Finland, the KBF could not risk moving around much and the fuel-oil shortage virtually immobilized the largest warships. Nevertheless, even from their anchorages the Soviet warships could bombard targets around Pushkin and Krasnoye Selo. On the receiving end, the Germans found the Soviet heavy naval gunfire discouraging but not very accurate. Amazingly, less than 30 per cent of Soviet naval gunfire used an observer - often it was just fired at area targets - which greatly diminished its effectiveness. Yet the KBF fired over 25,000 rounds against German ground troops during September 1941, which played a major role in stopping the enemy's final lunge toward the city.

During the course of the siege of Leningrad, the KBF provided over 125,000 sailors to fight in ground units, comprising nine rifle brigades, one ski regiment, 38 separate battalions and 32 artillery batteries. The 1st Naval Rifle Brigade played a crucial role in holding Leningrad in 1941 but was virtually destroyed, while the 2nd, 5th and 6th naval rifle brigades helped to hold the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The 4th Naval Rifle Brigade was tasked with defending the ice road over Lake Ladoga in the winter of 1941/42 and spent virtually the entire winter on the ice.

The extremely fast G5 torpedo boat was ultimately derived from a series of designs by a team under the leadership of the noted aircraft designer A. l. Tupolev. Nearly 300 were built, with 73 being lost during the war, and dozens remained in commission after 1945.

The Soviet navy was small compared with other Allied navies. It had three battleships and some 50 destroyers, as well as a large submarine force of more than 200 boats. Coastal craft were important, and the Soviet fleet had about 300 torpedo boats. Generally speaking, however, Soviet naval forces did not play a major role in the war.

SUBMARINES

Numerically, at the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union had the world’s largest submarine fleet. But the boats were poorly commanded and inadequately crewed, most of the best officers having been purged by Joseph Stalin in 1937. The Soviet submarine fleet was also poorly armed, the Soviet navy never having developed a reliable torpedo. For this reason, the submarine fleet was used almost exclusively for defensive purposes. It is believed that the Soviet fleet lost one submarine for every enemy ship sunk. K Class. This was the most important class of Soviet submarine. It displaced 2,095 tons submerged and could cruise at 18 knots surfaced and nine knots underwater. Armament consisted of six bow torpedo tubes and four stern torpedo tubes. These submarines had good endurance but were never deployed far from home because they were almost exclusively confined to defensive duty.

COASTAL CRAFT

The only truly distinctive vessels of the Soviet navy in World War II were the coastal craft, of which the most important and innovative was the G5 torpedo boat. Designed by famed aircraft designer A. N. Tupolev, the G5s were built in a quantity of nearly 300, of which 73 were lost in action. They displaced 16 tons and were 62.66 feet in length, with a beam of 11.15 feet and a draft of 3.28 feet. Two gasoline engines developed 2,000 bhp for a very fast top speed of 48 knots. The boats were armed with two 21-inch torpedoes and a pair of half-inch machine guns. The complement was seven officers and men.

Further reading: Breyer, Siegfried. Soviet Warship Development. London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993; McLaughlin, Stephen. Russian and Soviet Battleships. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003; Polmar, Norman, and Jurrien Noot. Submarines of the Russian and Soviet Navies, 1718–1990. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1991.